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I. INTRODUCTION
This article explores ethical issues facing lawyers and investment
bankers in mergers and acquisitions through the use of a hypothetical
problem that raises issues in both private and public company transac-
tions.' The hypothetical was the basis of a panel discussion on Ethics
Issues in M & A: A Problem Approach, which was part of the Work-
shop on Emerging Issues in Mergers and Acquisitions. The panelists,
who are set out above, are experts in legal ethics and experienced merg-
ers and acquisition attorneys.
Although the panelists were not able to address all of the issues
raised in the hypothetical, all of the identified issues are addressed in
1. The authors of this article drafted the problem. For a discussion of other ethical issues
arising in mergers and acquisitions see Roberta S. Karmel, The Role of Counsel in Corporate
Acquisitions and Takeovers: Conflicts and Complications, 39 HASTNGs L.J. 677 (1998); M.
Breen Haire, Comment: The Fiduciary Responsibilities of Investment Bankers in Charge of
Control Transactions: In re Daisy Systems Corp., 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 277 (1999); Miriam P.
Hechler, The Role of the Corporate Attorney Within the Takeover Context: Loyalties to Whom?,
21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 943 (1996); Tariq Mundiya, Liability of Investment Banks for Providing
Financial Advice, 27 SEC. REG L.J. 294 (1999); Marc I. Steinberg, The Role of Counsel in
Corporate Acquisitions and Takeovers: Conflicts and Complications, Attorney Conflicts of
Interest in Corporate Acquisitions, 39 HASTINos L.J. 579 (1988).
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this article and are supplemented by the salient comments made by the
panelists during the discussion. Answers to many of the issues the panel
uncovered are uncertain. Furthermore, many of the issues raised are not
peculiar to mergers and acquisitions and could arise in other business
contexts. For example, some issues present potential violations of com-
mon law fraud principles, fiduciary duty principles, or Rule lOb-5 under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("34 Act") which prohibits, inter
alia, fraud and misrepresentation in connection with the purchase of or
sale of securities.
The principal focus of the discussion here in connection with the
ethical duties of lawyers is the American Bar Association's Model Rules
of Professional Conduct2 and the American Law Institute's Restatement
of The Law Governing Lawyers.3
The hypothetical is set out in Section II and each of the ethical
issues is identified at the point it is raised in the hypothetical. In addi-
tion, the section of the article that addresses the issue is identified. Thus,
there is a link between the issues presented in the hypothetical and the
section of the article that addresses the issue.
II. HYPOTHETICAL PROBLEM: THE PRIVATE AND PUBLIC
ACQUISITION SCENE
A. Introduction
Set forth below is a summary of the events surrounding a hypothet-
ical acquisition by a public company, Consumers Choice, Inc., of a suc-
cessful family-owned business, Technology, Inc. Shortly after acquiring
Technology, Inc., Consumers Choice was approached by ALO.com,
Inc., a public company, about the possibility of combining in a merger
of equals. Before that transaction was consummated, Macro Ware Inc.,
a large publicly-held computer software company, made a hostile tender
offer for ALO. Thus, the facts present a private transaction, a merger of
equals between publicly-held companies and a hostile tender offer.
B. The Cast of Characters
Consumers Choice is a leading manufacturer and merchandiser of a
wide range of consumer goods. Through its domestic and international
operations, Consumers Choice caters to mass retailers and wholesalers,
home centers, and office super-stores that do business through more than
2. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (3d Ed. 1996); see also AMERICAN ANN.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9 (3d Ed. 1996) [hereinafter ABA MODEL
RULES ANN.].
3. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (1998).
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twenty subsidiaries, affiliates and divisions. Consumers Choice has
annual revenues of approximately $10 billion. Its stock trades on the
New York Stock Exchange.
Technology is the leading producer and marketer of "high-end"
anodized aluminum products for the automotive industry. Over the past
four years, Technology has broadened its business through the acquisi-
tion of five cookware companies to include name-brand, luxury-line alu-
minum cookware, particularly, state-of-the-art aluminum pots and pans.
The investment banking firm of Silk & Stockings assisted in these
acquisitions by Technology.
Technology is owned by two brothers, Robert and William Bottom-
line. Robert owns seventy-five percent of Technology's stock and is its
president. William owns twenty-five percent. William is not actively
involved in Technology's business. The Bottomline brothers increas-
ingly have been at odds over the strategic focus of Technology. In May
1999, William indicated that he would rather cash out than continue to
have to suffer what he regarded to be Robert's mismanagement and con-
trol of the company. Robert was receptive; by the end of the month the
brothers were discussing a sale to Robert of William's twenty-five per-
cent interest (9,000 shares) for approximately $1,000 per share.
ALO.com, Inc., a NASDAQ traded company, is a leading marketer
of consumer products over the Internet and sees the possibility of sub-
stantial synergies and new business opportunities arising from a combi-
nation with Consumers Choice. It has been following Consumers
Choice for a significant period and thinks that the time is right to com-
bine the two firms.
Macro Ware is a leading software company that is traded on the
New York Stock Exchange. The CEO of Macro Ware, Bill King, has
been following the developments of ALO for a significant time and has
been considering making an offer for ALO. He is not interested at all in
Consumers Choice, and thinks that the announced merger between ALO
and Consumers Choice does not make sense.
C. The Consumers Choice-Technology Stock Purchase Agreement
On June 1, 1999, Consumers Choice's CEO, Jenny Sharpeye, con-
tacted Robert Bottomline to explore the possibility of Consumers Choice
acquiring all of Technology's outstanding common stock. Three days
later, Jenny met over lunch with Robert and Technology's outside cor-
porate attorney, Patricia Black, to begin discussing the possibility in ear-
nest. Robert and Consumers Choice entered into a confidentiality
agreement, which, among other things, prohibited Robert from discuss-
ing the proposed transaction with anyone other than his lawyer, account-
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ants and investment bankers. Consumers Choice did not ask Robert if
he owned all of the stock of Technology, and Robert did not volunteer
that there was another shareholder. As a result, Consumers Choice com-
menced due diligence and engaged the investment banking firm of Silk
& Stockings (though not the same Silk & Stockings personnel who had
previously assisted Technology in connection with its cookware com-
pany acquisitions) to assist it.
First Issue. The first issue, which is addressed in Section III, is
whether, and under what, conditions Silk & Stockings may switch sides
and represent Consumers Choice in the acquisition of its former client
Technology. This issue was presented recently in a U.K. court in con-
nection with a transaction in which Mannesmann, a German company,
was the target of a hostile bid by Vodafone, a U.K. company. Mannes-
mann alleged that Goldman Sachs, one of Vodafone's investment bank-
ers for the transaction and a former investment banker for Mannesmann,
had switched sides inappropriately.
Consumers Choice's proposed letter of intent contained some pro-
visions that were completely unacceptable to Robert Bottomline. In par-
ticular, the letter of intent contemplated an escrow of a significant
amount of the cash purchase price to be paid to the selling share-
holder(s). This would be used among other things, to secure a proposed
indemnity of Consumers Choice against losses arising from a pending
lawsuit brought against Technology by an alleged joint venture partner,
"PANS!," seeking over $20 million in damages for breach of contract
and fraud.
"You should tell Consumers Choice that this is a deal breaker -
either they accept the PANS! exposure, and with no price concession
from us, or we walk," said Patricia Black. "What makes you so damned
sure that they won't just say goodbye," asked Robert. "Trust me", Black
said,
there is no risk that they'll walk. Let me tell you something confi-
dentially: when Consumers Choice's general counsel faxed me a
revised draft of their proposed Letter of Intent, to my surprise
included in the papers was a 2-page memo from Consumers Choice's
president to its general counsel. At first, I just casually glanced at it,
but then I realized that it contained their 'final' positions on the deal
points. Paragraph 6 said something like: As you suggested, I called
PANS!' president to explore your idea that we might work out a set-
tlement of the suit through some kind of strategic alliance with
PANS! if Consumers Choice were to acquire Technology. He said
he'd drop the Technology suit "in a heartbeat" if a mutually agreea-
ble long-term alliance could be worked out. I have no doubt that we
2000]
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could achieve such an alliance. So, if necessary, we can live with the
PANS! exposure. Of course, we'll try to get a price concession if we
do give on this point.
Second, Third and Fourth Issues. This paragraph presents the sec-
ond, third and fourth issues. The second issue, which is addressed in
Section IV, concerns the nature of the "confidential" conversation run-
ning from the lawyer to the client. Is this communication protected by
the attorney client privilege? The third issue, which is addressed in Sec-
tion V, is whether it was ethical for Black to have read and used the
misdirected communication. The fourth issue, which is addressed in
Section VI, is whether it was ethical for the general counsel of Consum-
ers Choice to have suggested that the president of Consumers Choice
contact the president of PANS! directly without giving the attorney for
PANS! prior notice.
During the negotiations, Robert Bottomline maintained that the
PANS! litigation would become Consumers Choice's problem. Further,
when Consumers Choice's CFO broached a purchase price concession,
Patricia Black jumped in with the observation (though false) that "Con-
sumers Choice is not the only bidder in the picture, you know." Con-
sumers Choice yielded.
Fifth Issue. The fifth issue, which is addressed in Section VII, is
whether Black breached an ethical obligation by "lying" in the course of
the negotiations by implying that Consumers Choice was not the only
bidder.
D. Robert Bottomline's Acquisition of William Bottomline's Stock
On June 15, 1999, Robert Bottomline telephoned his brother and
suggested that they finalize Robert's purchase of William's twenty-five
percent stock position. He did not disclose his negotiations with Con-
sumers Choice. Indeed, he was prohibited from doing so by the confi-
dentiality agreement. Hence, in accordance with their previous
discussions, William agreed to sell his 9,000 shares to Robert for $1,000
per share.
Sixth Issue. As a prelude to addressing the issue below concerning
the propriety of attorney Black's conduct in facilitating Robert's acquisi-
tion of William's shares, the question first must be asked whether Robert
has breached a fiduciary duty in agreeing to purchase William's shares
without disclosing the potential sale of all of the stock to Consumers
Choice. This issue is addressed in Section VIII. Robert telephoned
Patricia Black to inform her of the deal and to request that she "contact
Bill's lawyer and get the deal done as quickly as possible." Like Robert
in his conversation with his brother, Patricia Black did not reveal to
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William's attorney Robert's negotiations with Consumers Choice for the
sale of all outstanding shares of Technology for $2,500 per share.
Seventh Issue. The seventh issue, which is addressed in Section IX,
is whether attorney Black's silence has facilitated a breach of fiduciary
duty owed by William in violation of substantive law or an ethical rule.
Robert's acquisition of William's shares closed on June 30, 1999. On
July 20, 1999, Consumers Choice and Robert Bottomline executed the
letter of intent, which provided, among other things, that, subject to exe-
cution of a definitive stock purchase agreement, Consumers Choice
would purchase all of Technology's shares for $2,500 per share. The
parties anticipated a closing by September 1, 1999.
E. The Closing of the Consumers Choice-Technology
Stock Purchase Agreement
Robert and Consumer's Choice entered into a definitive stock
purchase agreement and the sale of Robert's Technology stock pursuant
to the Stock Purchase Agreement closed as scheduled for the agreed
upon price of $2,500 per share. A few weeks before the closing, a small
transaction occurred: Robert Bottomline purchased an old warehouse
and its underlying land from Technology. The warehouse was located in
one of the most depressed, industrial parts of town. One morning at a
meeting of the firm's conflicts committee, a partner of Patricia Black's
mentioned that a client of their firm, a major urban development com-
pany, would announce its plans to develop and build a multi-purpose
shopping center/movie theater/hotel complex in the area of Technol-
ogy's old warehouse before year-end. Of course, when the news is
made public, the real estate values in the area will quadruple. Patricia
Black was a member of this committee.
Black immediately told Robert Bottomline what she had heard at
the firm, and Robert in turn immediately instructed Black to seek Con-
sumers Choice's consent to Technology's sale of the warehouse and
land to Robert at the then current fair market value.
Eighth Issue. The eighth issue, which is addressed in Section X, is
whether it was a violation of an ethical rule for Patricia Black to tell
Robert about the development. Accordingly, Black notified Consumers
Choice of Robert's desire to undertake the proposed real estate transac-
tion and, being that Consumers Choice had no interest in the property
and was delighted to see that Technology would be converting depressed
assets into cash, consented to the transaction.
Ninth Issue. The ninth issue, which is addressed in Section XI, is
whether attorney Black was obligated to disclose to a non-client, Con-
sumers Choice, the material information regarding the developer's plans.
2000]
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The real estate transaction closed the day before Consumers Choice
closed its purchase of all of the Technology stock from Robert. Patricia
Black represented Technology and, for good order's sake, Robert was
represented by separate real estate counsel - his fresh-out-of-law
school nephew.
F. ALO's Approach to Consumers Choice
Shortly after Consumers Choice closed the acquisition of Technol-
ogy, the CEO of ALO, Steve Vision, contacted the CEO of Consumers
Choice, Jenny Sharpeye, about a "merger-of-equals" between ALO and
Consumers Choice. The market capitalization of the two companies is
similar and Steve has proposed that the shareholders of each firm end up
with fifty percent of the combined entity, with Steve and Jenny serving
as Co-CEOs in all respects. The board of the combined entity would
consist of an equal number of members appointed by each company.
Thus, the proposed deal is a true merger-of-equals. The idea of the deal
came from Wayne Silk, a senior partner of Silk & Stockings who has
been an active advisor to Steve and ALO but not to Consumers Choice.
Jenny's immediate reaction is that the deal makes very good sense and
should be pursued but with the shareholders of Consumers Choice
receiving fifty-five percent of the stock of the combined firm. This
would give the shareholders of Consumer Choice a slight premium to
compensate for the faster growth in earnings at Consumers Choice.
Jenny also thinks the timing is right for doing this type of deal now.
Assuming Steve is willing to go with the premium, Jenny wants to move
as quickly as possible.
Jenny called Fred Stockings, the senior partner from Silk & Stock-
ings who often works on big deals for Consumers Choice and asked him
to work on this deal with ALO. Jenny also called Stu Stone, the senior
partner of Consumers Choice's outside law firm, Stone & Cold, who
supervised the work on the Technology deal and asked for the assistance
of Stone & Cold. Steve Vision had already contacted Keith Cold,
another senior partner at Stone & Cold and asked Stone & Cold to
represent ALO on the transaction. Thus, Steve Vision and Jenny
Sharpeye have attempted to retain members of the same investment
banking firm and the same law firm. Wayne Silk and Fred Stockings
have proposed that their firm can represent both sides of this transaction
as long as the parties agree. Silk & Stockings has previously repre-
sented both sides of a transaction, but only after erecting appropriate
firewalls. Even with consent and firewalls, Stu Stone and Keith Cold
think that they probably cannot represent both parties. However, they
are being urged by their partners to at least explore the possibility. The
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partners argue that, as Wachtell Lipton has represented both parties in a
public transaction, Stone & Cold should be able to do so also as long as
there are appropriate consents. An article in the New York Times
addressing dual representation by both law firms and investment bankers
explains:
Wachtell Lipton Rosen & Katz gave legal advice to both the Banc
One Corporation and the First Chicago NBD Corporation in a $30
billion merger; Merrill Lynch & Company advised Italy's Credito
Italiano and Unicredito in a $10 billion combination, and . . .
Goldman advised the Norwest Corporation and Wells Fargo & Com-
pany on their $34 billion merger.4
As Steve and Jenny wish to conclude the deal quickly, they are
willing to consent to the dual representation if it expedites the deal.
They need to know quickly whether this dual representation by the
investment bankers and the lawyers is feasible.
Tenth Issue. The tenth issue, which is addressed in Section XII, is
whether Silk & Stockings and Stone & Cold can undertake this dual
representation, and if so, under what conditions. To answer this ques-
tion, both firms will have to consider issues such as what if the parties
are unable to agree on the exchange ratio and what if a third party makes
a competing offer for one of the merging firms?
Both Steve and Jenny have read the recent article in the Wall Street
Journal about the $35 million dollar success fee that Time Warner Inc.
will pay to the law firm of Cravath, Swaine & Moore if the merger with
America Online Inc. goes through.5 If the deal is not completed,
Cravath will be paid a much smaller fee. As an inducement to expedit-
ing the deal, Steve and Jenny are each proposing to pay Stone & Cold a
success fee if the deal closes and a fraction of the standard hourly rates if
the deal does not close. They both think it is appropriate to have this
type of incentive for lawyers, who can sometimes be deal breakers.
Eleventh Issue. The eleventh issue, which is examined in Section
XIII, is whether and under what conditions Stone & Cold can agree to
this success fee arrangement.
After due consideration, they proceed with the dual representation.
In the course of tough negotiations over the exchange ratio, Steve sug-
gests to Jenny that she should get a new employment contract complete
with a significant increase in salary and other benefits that will put Jenny
slightly ahead of Steve. Steve is not much concerned with salary,
4. Laura M. Holson, It Takes 2 to Merge but One Firm to Give Advice, N.Y. Tirms, June 13,
1998, at D1.
5. See Cravath, Swaine & Moore: Time Warner Counsel Gets Huge Fee if Merger Occurs,
WALL ST. J. INTERACTIVE EDMON, Jan. 21 2000.
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because he owns thirty percent of ALO's stock. Shortly after this propo-
sal, Jenny settles on a fifty-fifty split in the shareholdings.
Twelfth Issue. The twelfth issue, which is addressed in Section
XIV, is whether the lawyers for Consumers Choice can merely accept
this deal on salary even though there are grounds to believe that Jenny
may have settled on the fifty-fifty split because she is being given the
higher salary.
G. Macro Ware's Unsolicited Offer for ALO
As indicated, Bill King, the CEO of Macro Ware, has long been
interested in ALO, and thinks now is the time to make a bid for ALO
prior to the completion of its deal with Consumers Choice. Bill has
retained the law firm of Blue & Blood and the investment-banking firm
of Quick & Easy to represent Macro Ware on the transaction.
In consultation with Blue & Blood and Quick & Easy, it is decided
that Bill King will approach Steve Vision, ALO's CEO, with an offer
that is forty percent higher than the trading price of ALO's shares on the
date of the offer. ALO's shares are currently trading at $100 per share.
It is also decided that Bill will not approach Steve until the FTC has
issued its expected second request for information relating to the anti-
trust aspects of the Consumers Choice deal. It is expected that the sec-
ond request, which will delay the potential FTC clearance of the
transaction, will be issued within ten days. This time frame was selected
believing it will be best to make the offer to Steve at the point when the
antitrust clearance of the Consumers Choice transaction is in doubt. It is
decided that if Steve does not react favorably to Bill's offer, then Macro
Ware would make a tender offer for ALO.
During the period between the date of the decision to make the
premium offer and the date of the offer, the shares of ALO went up from
$100 to $110. This resulted in Macro Ware making an offer to ALO for
$144 per share rather than $140 per share. As noted below, after a
tender offer and proxy contest, Macro Ware succeeded in acquiring
ALO for the $144 offer price.
The increase in ALO's share price was largely attributable to two
massive insider trading schemes. The first originated with a summer
associate in the Blue & Blood firm. The associate learned of the pro-
posed offer by Macro Ware for ALO at a firm luncheon at which the
head of the firm's mergers and acquisitions department told the summer
associates that they should "watch the press closely within the next sev-
eral days, because the firm's new client Macro Ware was going to upset
the ALO-Consumers Choice transaction by making a premium offer for
ALO." Blue & Blood does not have any special procedures in place to
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prevent insider trading, because it has always viewed its lawyers as
beyond reproach and never in its 100-year history has it had an insider
trading violation.
The second scheme originated with a broker at Quick & Easy who
cracked a computer code and learned about Macro Ware's planned offer.
Due to a previous injunction between Quick & Easy and the SEC result-
ing from an insider trading violation, Quick & Easy had erected what it
thought was an air tight firewall between its M&A department and its
brokerage operation.
It can be fairly established that if the insider trading had not taken
place, it is likely that Macro Ware would have completed the transaction
at $140 per share. Thus, the insider trading caused Macro Ware to pay
an extra $4 per share, which aggregated to a total of $50 million.
Thirteenth Issue. The thirteenth issue, which is addressed in Sec-
tion XV, involves the potential liability of Blue & Blood and Quick &
Easy for the insider trading by their employees. This liability could run
to the sellers of the securities purchased in the scheme as provided for
"certain controlling persons" under Sections 20A and 20(a) of the 34
Act. In addition, if Blue & Blood or Quick & Easy are found to have
controlling person liability under Section 21A of the 34 Act, the firm
would could be fined the greater of $1,000,000 or three times the profits
gained by the primary violator. Another issue is whether Macro Ware
could recover from its advisors for the $50 million additional payment it
was required to make to complete the transaction.
When Bill King presented the offer to Steve Vision, Steve immedi-
ately said, "No way. I did not build this company to turn it over to you."
Steve immediately called the lawyers for ALO, Stone & Cold and the
investment bankers, Silk & Stockings, and told them to make sure Bill
King's offer does not succeed. He said, "I don't care what it takes, erect
every barrier to a takeover by Macro Ware." Further, he reminded both
firms that their success fees were tied to the Consumers Choice deal and
not to any deal with Macro Ware. Despite these instructions, Silk &
Stockings tried to negotiate a transaction fee if an ALO/Macro Ware
deal occurred and a success fee if ALO were successful in defending
itself, but Steve would not budge.
Stone & Cold and Silk & Stockings launched an extensive defense
to Macro Ware's offer, and Macro Ware was required to launch a hostile
tender offer with a proxy contest to remove ALO's poison pill. Silk &
Stockings issued an opinion to the effect that the $144 per share offer
was inadequately priced from a financial standpoint.
After a long protracted fight, Macro Ware succeeded in acquiring
ALO, leaving Consumers Choice out in the cold. Because of the doubts
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raised about the final outcome of the proxy contest, the shares of ALO
traded at prices far below the $144 per share ultimately paid by Macro
Ware. Thus, the ALO shareholders that sold during this period would
have been much better off if Steve had not undertaken the defensive
actions.
Fourteenth Issue. The fourteenth issue, which is addressed in Sec-
tion XVI, concerns the appropriateness of the defensive tactics recom-
mended by Stone & Cold and Quick & Easy in response to Steve's
direction.
III. FIRST ISSUE: SWITCHING SIDES
Silk & Stockings has previously represented Technology and is
now going to represent Consumers Choice in its acquisition of Technol-
ogy. This move raises the question of whether a "switching of sides" by
the investment bankers is an impermissible ethical conflict. Silk &
Stockings had previously advised Technology in connection with Tech-
nology's purchase of five cookware companies, and presumably gained
some - and perhaps a great deal - of confidential information about
Technology's business and negotiation strategies. Whether such a prior
relationship should preclude it from representing the adverse party, Con-
sumers Choice, without Technology's informed consent even in the
absence of specific evidence of actual misuse of Technology's confiden-
tial information, becomes a key issue.
Rule 1.9 of the ABA Model Rules provides: "A lawyer who has
formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent
another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that
person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former
client unless the former client consents after consultation."6 A common
way to determine whether the matters are "substantially related" is to
ask whether the attorney "could have obtained confidential information
in the first representation that would have been relevant in the second." 7
If the matters are deemed to be "substantially related," the lawyer and,
by imputation under Rule 1.10 all members of the lawyer's firm, are
presumed irrebutably to have obtained such confidential information
which then would be used on behalf of the current client against the
interests of the former client.8 Analytical provides, "It is irrelevant
whether [the attorney] actually obtained such information and used it
against his former client, or whether - if the lawyer is a firm rather
than an individual practitioner - different people in the firm handled
6. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra note 2, Rule 1.9.
7. See, e.g., Analytical, Inc. v. NPD Research, Inc., 708 F.2d 1263, 1266 (7th Cir. 1983).
8. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra note 2, Rule 1.10.
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the two matters and scrupulously avoided discussing them."9
In Formal Ethics Opinion 99-415, the ABA's Standing Committee
on Professional Responsibility clarified that the term "substantially
related matter," which is not defined in the Model Rules, also contem-
plates a continuing duty of "loyalty" to a former client.10 Thus, in addi-
tion to Rule 1.9's concern with protecting against the risk that a lawyer
might misuse a former client's confidential information, Formal Opinion
99-415 makes it clear that the "substantial relationship test" also applies
to prohibit an attorney from representing a client against a former client
without the former client's consent where the adverse representation
involves the work that the lawyer had done for the former client, regard-
less of whether the former client's confidences would be misused."'
Given this analytical framework, it is apparent why the Model Rules
generally do not allow screening devices (i.e., so-called "firewalls") to
be employed to overcome the ethical obstacles created by such "side
switching."
In contrast, investment bankers are not subject to such irrebuttable
presumptions, loyalty obligations or imputation rules.12 Instead, they
are generally limited in their use of a former client's confidential infor-
mation only by contract and common law principles governing fiduciary
relationships that prohibit the fiduciary from using such information to
the extent that such use actually would harm the former client. It is
helpful to consider the decision of the U.K.'s High Court of Justice in
Mannesmann AG v. Goldman Sachs International. 3 In this case, Man-
nesmann AG, a German company, sought to enjoin Goldman Sachs
from acting on behalf of Vodafone Airtouch plc., a U.K. company, in its
hostile takeover offer for Mannesmann on the grounds that Goldman had
previously represented Mannesmann. 4 In denying the injunction, the
High Court said,: "The applicable principle of substantive law is
accordingly that [Mannesmann AG] as owner of confidential informa-
tion is entitled to prevent [Goldman Sachs] from exposing [Mannes-
mann AG] to any avoidable real (as opposed to fanciful) risk that
confidential information might be disclosed to third parties or otherwise
misused."'"
9. Analytical, 708 F.2d at 1266.
10. ABA Standing Comm. on Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 415 (1999).
11. Id.
12. See generally, General Acquisition, Inc. v. Gen Corp., Inc., 766 F. Supp. 1460 (S.D. Ohio
1990); Wiener v. Lazard Freres & Co., 241 A.D.2d 114 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).
13. High Court of Justice, Chancery Division, The Honorable Mr. Justice Lightman,
Transcript of Judgment (Nov. 18, 1999).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
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Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co. 16 presents a somewhat analogous
American situation. In Walton, the court held that an acquiring firm's
investment banker who received confidential information from a poten-
tial target during the course of tender offer negotiations did not owe a
fiduciary duty to the target, even where the investment banking firm had
agreed to return the information.' 7 Consequently, there was no prohibi-
tion against the investment banking firm trading on the basis of the
information.
On the other hand, in his dissent, Judge Oakes concluded that the
"acceptance of [the confidential] information by Morgan Stanley . . .
along with its understood role as intermediary in a cooperative takeover,
imposed a duty on the investment banker under well-established com-
mon law principles not to use that information for its own profit. '" 8 In
this type of situation, the SEC seems to have adopted Judge Oakes view
under Rule 10b-5.' 9 Proposed Rule 10b5-2, which was announced on
December 15, 1999, applies to any violation of Rule lOb-5 that is "based
on the purchase or sale of securities on the basis of, or the communica-
tion of, material nonpublic information misappropriated in breach of a
duty of trust and confidence."20
Two of the enumerated duties of trust or confidence set out in Pro-
posed Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) are
(1) Whenever a person agrees to maintain information in confidence;
[and] (2) Whenever the person communicating the material nonpublic
information and the person to whom it is communicated have a his-
tory, pattern, or practice of sharing confidences, such that the person
communicating the material nonpublic information has a reasonable
expectation that the other person would maintain its confidentiality.2'
It seems clear that if Proposed Rule 10b5-2 had been in effect when
Walton was decided, in the situation in Walton, Morgan Stanley would
have been in violation of that rule. It is possible that the Proposed Rule
10b-5 approach will have an impact in determining whether investment
bankers generally owe the duties of trust and confidence to former
clients.
However, the hypothetical suggests that there could be uncertainty
as to whether Silk & Stockings has violated a fiduciary duty. Should the
uncertainty be resolved by regarding Silk & Stockings as precluded (by
16. 623 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1980).
17. Id. at 799.
18. Id. at 801.
19. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1999).
20. Proposed Rule 10b5-2(a), announced in SEC Release No. 34-42259 (Dec. 15, 1999)
[hereinafter Insider Trading Release].
21. Id.
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the kind of presumptions and imputations that govern side-switching by
attorneys in adverse matters that are "substantially related") from advis-
ing Consumers Choice without Technology's informed consent even
though there is no evidence of actual misuse of technology's confiden-
tial information? In this regard, General Acquisition, Inc. v. GenCorp.,
Inc. is instructive.22 In this case, the court denied a motion to dismiss a
breach of fiduciary duty claim under Ohio law against an investment
bank that allegedly had been retained by a company to advise it on
acquisitions and then disclosed confidential information regarding the
company to a corporate raider that made a tender offer, with the assis-
tance of the investment bank, for the company.23 Also, in Wiener v.
Lazard Freres & Co., the court permitted a company that had retained
an investment banker in connection with a financing to proceed with a
breach of fiduciary duty claim against the banker for allegedly misusing
the company's confidential information by passing the information to
another party.24
It seems clear, however, that outside of the context of the situation
covered by Proposed Rule lOb-5 (assuming this proposed rule is
adopted), as noted above, the law does not prevent Silk & Stockings
from switching sides as long as there is no breach of fiduciary duty or
contractual provision. One way of addressing the issue that Silk &
Stockings now faces would be for it to obtain from Technology a prior
waiver that would permit Silk & Stockings to represent an adverse party
in certain defined circumstances. Joe Flom indicates that his firm rou-
tinely gets this type of waiver from certain clients for which it under-
takes specific tasks.
IV. SECOND ISSUE: COUNSEL'S CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATION
TO THE CLIENT
How realistic is it for attorney Patricia Black to suppose that her
"confidential" communications with Robert Bottomline concerning the
misdirected fax will remain confidential after the stock purchase? Could
Consumers Choice, as the controlling shareholder of Technology after
the acquisition, waive Rule 1.6 which provides that a "lawyer shall not
reveal information relating to representation of a client unless the client
consents . . .?" In general, a successor may waive the corporation's
privilege. 25 However, at least one case has held that communications
22. General Acquisition, 766 F. Supp. at 1498.
23. See id. at 1488.
24. See Weiner v. Lazard Freres & Co., 672 N.Y.S.2d. 8 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998). See
generally Mundiya, supra note 1, at 307-10.
25. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 347 (1985).
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between counsel for an acquired corporation and the selling shareholder
remain protected against a successor's waiver of the attorney-client priv-
ilege to the extent communications concerned the acquisition itself.26
In the context of the hypothetical, the communication was between
attorney Patricia Black and Robert Bottomline in his capacity as the sell-
ing shareholder; Black was, therefore, not acting as counsel to Technol-
ogy. Presumably, Technology has no rights to confidentiality that can
be waived by Consumers Choice as the controlling shareholder after the
acquisition; the rights arguably are those of Robert.
However, the fact that the communication is going from the lawyer
to the client raises a more fundamental question, as it involves factual
information, not legal advice. Is this the type of communication that is
protected by the attorney-client privilege?
The privilege against compelled disclosure ordinarily does not
cover purely factual material not related to the provision of legal ser-
vices or advice. Here, Patricia Black's comments seem to go to negoti-
ating strategy, advice that could come from anyone, whether a lawyer or
not. So, in asking whether this type of communication is (or ought to
be) privileged against disclosure, it might be appropriate to consider
questions such as: when is the lawyer in a deal acting as "a lawyer," and
when is he or she acting as the client's business-negotiation agent or
counselor? Can the roles be so compartmentalized? And, what are the
evidentiary, ethical and substantive consequences that follow from how
one looks at the lawyer's role(s) in the deal?
V. THIRD ISSUE: READING THE OTHER SIDES
MISDIRECTED COMMUNICATION
Was it ethical for attorney Patricia Black to read and use the oppos-
ing party's misdirected privileged communication? What was counsel
to do? Not read the fax, even though it came to her through no wrong-
doing on her or her client's part? Wouldn't she be obligated to represent
her client vigorously and with everything at her command? The
approach taken by the ABA's Standing Committee on Ethics and Profes-
sional Responsibility is that a lawyer who has received an opponent's
confidential information mistakenly should not examine it, but instead
should request the opponent's instructions.27 The assumption is that the
opponent made a mistake, and did not voluntarily waive his right to
confidentiality. Accordingly, as discussed below, since as an "inadver-
tent waiver" may be regarded as a legal oxymoron (a "waiver" is the
26. See Tekni-plex, Inc. v. Meyner and Landis, 89 N.Y.2d 123, 138 (N.Y. 1996).
27. See ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 368
(1992).
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intentional relinquishment of a known right),2" the receiving lawyer and
his or her client ought not to take advantage of the error.
Would the situation change if Patricia Black did not realize that the
document was privileged and confidential until after she reviewed it?
Must she back out of negotiations or the representation of her client
completely because she has been poisoned by confidential information?
If so, does this give an unscrupulous counsel a mechanism for disquali-
fying an unwanted lawyer for the other side?
In any case, there are jurisdictions that hold to Wigmore's view
that, inadvertent or not, once confidentiality has been lost, there is no
privilege or other entitlement to confidentiality.29 Thus, if one is in a
Wigmore jurisdiction, wouldn't it be malpractice not to use the informa-
tion innocently received, regardless of what the ABA would have coun-
sel do?
Finally, does it make a difference if the misdirected fax went to
Robert Bottomline and not to Patricia Black, and Robert brought it to the
attention of Black? How could Black possibly prevent Robert from
using the information in the negotiations? Art Fleischer contends that
the lawyer is obligated to inform the other side of the misdirected com-
munication. Black has an ethical obligation to return the document and
not disclose the information to the client. Barry Alberts asked, "What
interest is being protected in this instance?" Lou Kaden asked if Black
read it inadvertently and returned it, was Black required not to tell her
client about it? Jack Coffee asked, "What if the other side continues
with their negotiating position even though the document has been
returned?" He went on to ask: "Does the lawyer now have an obliga-
tion to tell the client about the document?" He expressed the view that
"the negligence of the one side should not disable the effectiveness of
the lawyer for the other side." He concluded that "one side's negligence
[should not cause] the other side [to] lose the effective advocacy of its
lawyer who knows that there has been a misrepresentation made to his
client."
Anthony Alfieri stated that the "Model Rules allow you to slow the
conveyance of information to the client." Further, he knows of "nothing
in the current rules that would allow the lawyer to not disclose the infor-
mation to the client."
Barry Alberts said that the discussion assumed that the information
was privileged, and stated that an argument could be made that the infor-
mation is not within the privilege. Art Fleischer countered that this is an
28. See, e.g., Mendenhall v. Barbara Greene Co., 531 F. Supp. 951, 954-55 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
29. See 8 JOHN WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2325 at 633 (McNaughton Rev. 1961); International
Digital Systems Corp. v. Digital Equipment Corp., 120 F.R.D. 445, 456 (D. Mass. 1988).
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issue of secrecy or confidentiality. Barry Alberts responded that if the
"information is not privileged and comes to the lawyer through the neg-
ligence of the other side, might it not be malpractice for the lawyer not
to use it?" In a final comment on this issue, Art Fleischer said that the
lawyer should not explicitly reveal the document to the client but the
lawyer should be able to use the information in advising the client. Is
this thought a presumptuous decision on the part of the lawyer? What if
the client, for example, would refuse to allow the use of the document if
he knew about it?
VI. FOURTH ISSUE: COMMUNICATING WITH ANOTHER PARTY
WITHOUT GOING THROUGH THE PARTY'S LAWYER
Rule 4.2 provides: "[i]n representing a client a lawyer shall not
communicate about the subject matter of the representation with a per-
son the lawyer knows to be represented in the matter, unless the lawyer
has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by law to do so."3°
Presumably, lawyers may not ethically "cause" a client or client's agent
to do indirectly what the lawyer could not do directly." Therefore, the
issue is whether Consumers Choice's general counsel has violated Rule
4.2 in having Consumers Choice contact PANS! without the consent of
counsel for PANS!.
Read literally, Rule 4.2 does not apply, because the "subject mat-
ter" of counsel's representation of Consumers Choice is not the same
"matter" as the PANS! suit against Technology.32 Yet, a persuasive
argument can be mustered that the spirit of the ethical rule has been
violated. Indeed, the argument can be made that the matter involves all
issues material to the acquisition, which includes the PANS! litigation.
If this argument is followed, the situation is not just within the spirit of
the rule but also within the literal terms of the rule.
This raises the question of how broadly or narrowly the ethical pro-
hibition on ex-parte contacts with opposing parties (or, as here, soon-to-
be opposing parties) should be read in the M & A context. In this
regard, Joel Greenberg, a member of the ABA's Negotiated Acquisitions
Task Force, has raised a question regarding New York's version of Rule
4.2, which provides: "During the course of the representation of a client
a lawyer shall not: (1) communicate or cause another to communicate
on the subject of the representation with a party the lawyer knows to be
represented by a lawyer in that matter unless the lawyer has the prior
consent of the lawyer representing such other party or is authorized by
30. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra note 2, Rule 4.2.
31. See, e.g., Miano v. AC&BR Advertising, Inc., 148 F.R.D. 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
32. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra note 2, Rule 4.2.
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law to do so .... 3 This provision goes on to state that notwithstanding
this prohibition "a lawyer may cause a client to communicate with a
represented party, . . .provided the lawyer gives reasonable advance
notice to the represented party's counsel that such communications will
be taking place. '34 Thus, the New York rule directly prohibits a lawyer
from "causing" the client or any other person to contact another repre-
sented party without prior notice to such party's counsel.
In criticizing this provision, which he points out is a liberalization
of the prior rule that required advance consent of the other lawyer rather
than mere notice, Joel Greenberg argues:
"Unless the word 'cause' is given a very narrow meaning (i.e., to
exclude concepts of recommending or encouraging) ... [the] rule -
which seems to me to clearly derive from a litigation context - is
totally impractical in the M & A transactional world in which all of
us practice. It would characterize as an ethical violation a suggestion
to your client or its investment banker that he or she discuss an eco-
nomic term of a transaction with the other principal unless you
remember to give the other lawyer reasonable advance notice."
VII. FIFTH ISSUE: "LYING" IN NEGOTIATIONS
Patricia Black has falsely claimed that "Consumers Choice is not
the only bidder in the picture .... ." Is this statement a violation of Rule
4.1(a) of the ABA Model Rules, which provides that "[i]n the course of
representing a client, a lawyer shall not knowingly make a false state-
ment of material fact or law to a third person?"36 Is Patricia's statement
simply the kind of negotiation bluster that no one reasonably would rely
upon, or might it properly be deemed to be a violation of Rule 4.1 ? The
issue, of course, raises "truth-in-negotiation" issues generally, spotlight-
ing the line(s) between the kind of dissimulation that is permissible,
indeed expected, in the world of negotiation and deal making, and the
kind of impermissible misrepresentation that is unethical. In this con-
nection, Rule 8.49(c) of the Model Rules provides that it is "professional
misconduct for a lawyer to: ... (c) engage in conduct involving dishon-
esty, fraud deceit or misrepresentation ...
Apart from ethical considerations, is it possible that the statement
could give rise to a violation under Rule lOb-5 or principles of common
law fraud? Is the materiality standard in Rule 4.1 the same as the mate-
33. N.Y. ETmics RULE § 1200.35(a) (1990).
34. Id. at § 1200.35(b).
35. E-mail message from Joel Greenberg, to ABA Negotiated Acquisitions Committee (July
20, 1999).
36. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUc-r, supra note 2, Rule 4.1(a).
37. Id., Rule 8.49(c).
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riality standard under Rule l0b-5?38 Under Rule lOb-5, a misrepresenta-
tion or an omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that
the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reason-
able investor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of informa-
tion available. 9 In this context, it is at least arguable that Patricia
Black's false statement was a material misrepresentation under this stan-
dard. It should be noted that this is not an issue of whether Patricia
might be a secondary participant and, therefore, not liable under the
Supreme Court's holding in Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate
Bank of Denver 0 that there is no private civil aiding and abetting liabil-
ity, because as explained by Professor Prentice "[in]" Central Bank, the
majority accepted the universal rule that Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5
impose an obligation upon persons not to defraud investors through
affirmative misrepresentations. "41
Assuming Consumers Choice went forward with the purchase of
Robert Bottomline is shares, it is possible that Consumers Choice would
have a cause of action against Patricia Black under Rule lOb-5. In set-
ting out the elements of a claim under Rule lOb-5, the court in Scatter-
good v. Perelman said:
the plaintiff must allege that the defendant (1) with scienter - an
intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud, Ernst & Ernst.... (2) made
misleading statements or omissions, Santa Fe Industries . . ., (3) of
material fact, TSC Industries . . ., (4) upon which plaintiff-a pur-
chaser or seller of the security, Blue Chip Stamps . . ., (5) relied in
entering the transaction, Basic, Inc .... and (6) which caused eco-
nomic loss to the plaintiff. In re Phillips Petroleum ..... 4
While it is by no means certain that Patricia Black's false statement
gives rise to liability under Rule lOb-5, it is also not clear that she is free
of such liability.
Chancellor Allen argues that a lawyer cannot make a "flatly false
statement in the context of negotiations." He maintains, therefore, that
while the lawyer could not say that Consumer Choice is not the only
bidder when it is, the attorney could say "you aren't the only fish in the
sea." This "would not be flatly false because there could be other poten-
tial bidders." Lou Kaden then asked whether this statement would not
falsely connote that there is another bidder. On the other hand, Barry
38. See id. at Rule 4.1; see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1999).
39. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 468 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988) (quoting TSC Industries, Inc. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976)).
40. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
41. Robert A. Prentice, Locating that "Indistinct" and "Virtual Nonexistent" Line Between
Primary and Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b), 75 N.C. L. REV. 691, 718 (1997).
42. 945 F.2d 618, 622 (3rd Cir. 1991).
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Alberts asked whether any lawyer would rely on such a statement. Art
Fleischer said that the response depends on the person who is making
the statement.
Analyzing the issue from another perspective, Bob Mundheim
asked what would happen if the investment banker makes the statement
that there are other bidders, although there are not. Jim Freund
responded that he would "in confidence tell the investment banker to get
back to the other investment banker and advise him that he was talking
about possible bidders, not real bidders." Justice Moore asked: "What
if the investment banker refuses?" Jim Freund's response was that he
would then go to the client.
In referring to his chapter on Lying in Negotiations,43 Jim Freund
says that sometimes it is difficult to draw the line between mere puffing
and a misrepresentation of fact." He states that a helpful test is whether
the nature of the statement is likely to be relied on and "the element of
"justifiable reliance becomes more critical."45 He adds that the "more
specific the statement the more likely it is going to be treated as a factual
representation for which the negotiator may be held liable."'4 6 He further
elaborates that the less specific, such as there are "other fish in the sea"
should not be a problem, but a statement that there are other bidders
when there are not is a specific statement, that if given by a lawyer, is an
ethical violation.47 He makes the point as follows in his book:
So, what guidelines can we derive [about lying in negotiations]? One
of the commentators has suggested a helpful test: that liability for
misrepresentation should depend on whether the deception causes
some unfairness in the bargaining situation. Thus, the issue is not
whether there's intent to deceive or mislead, but rather, whether or
not the nature of the statement makes it likely that the negotiator will
succeed in doing so. In this formulation, the element of justifiable
reliance becomes critical. And the more specific the statement, the
more likely it will be treated as a factual representation for which the
negotiator may be held liable; the less specific - this case is a 'real
winner' or this transaction 'a real steal'- the greater likelihood of it
being considered mere opinion or puffing.48
Art Fleischer says the issue is "whether the statement is made with
the expectation that it will be relied on, and if so there is a problem."
43. JAMES C. FREUND, THE AcQuISrTON MATING DANCE AND OTHER ESSAYS ON
NEGOTIATING: LYING IN NEGOTIATIONS (1987).
44. Id. at 159.
45. Id. at 168.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 165-68.
48. Id. at 168.
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Barry Alberts concluded, by asking whether a lawyer can ever be
"fully candid in a negotiation without engaging in malpractice?"
VIII. SIXTH ISSUE: PURCHASING A SHAREHOLDER'S SHARES AT A
TIME WHEN THERE IS A POTENTIAL BUYER
FOR ALL THE SHARES
William Bottomline has agreed to sell his shares to his brother,
Robert, at a time when Robert is in negotiations to sell all of the Tech-
nology shares to Consumers Choice. Before addressing the ethical and
legal issues attorney Patricia Black faces in facilitating Robert's acquisi-
tion of William's shares, the first issue to be addressed is whether Rob-
ert has breached a fiduciary duty to William or a Rule lOb-5 duty to
affirmatively disclose to William material information about the Con-
sumers Choice negotiations prior to purchasing William's minority
stock position.49 As noted, William has entered into a confidentiality
agreement with Consumers Choice prohibiting the disclosure of the
negotiations.
Turning first to the state law fiduciary duty issue, it is helpful to
focus on Section 5.16(a) of the ALI's Principles of Corporate Govern-
ance: Analysis and Recommendations. 50 This section provides that
although a controlling shareholder generally can dispose of his or her
shares at a premium, such a shareholder violates the duty of fair dealing
if the shareholder "does not make disclosure concerning the transaction
... to other shareholders with whom the controlling shareholder deals in
connection with the transaction."'" Thus, without disclosure, Robert
would apparently violate his fiduciary duty to William.
Next, we look at Rule lOb-5. In Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., the
court found a potential violation of Rule 1Ob-5 where a corporation that
was in merger negotiations purchased its stock from an employee with-
out disclosing the merger negotiations.52 The court concluded that
"[c]lose corporations buying their stock, like knowledgeable insiders of
closely-held firms buying from outsiders, have a fiduciary duty to dis-
close material facts."53 Although it looks bad for Robert, William had
virtually agreed to sell his stock for $1,000 per share to Robert prior to
the point at which Consumers Choice first contacted Robert on June 1,
1999. Thus, this situation might raise the "possession-use" dichotomy,
49. See, e.g., Guy v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 1086, 1090-91 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
50. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 5.16
(1992).
51. Id.
52. 815 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1987).
53. Id. at 435.
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which is discussed below and remains unsettled in Rule lOb-5 civil liti-
gation. Robert might argue that his deal with Consumers Choice had
nothing to do with his deal with William, that, although he certainly had
knowledge of the potential sale to Consumers Choice he did not in any
way use this information in his negotiations with his brother. If he did
not use the information then, as the law currently stands, he may not
have violated Rule 1Ob-5. This is because some courts have held that
mere possession of inside information is not sufficient to establish a vio-
lation of Rule 1Ob-5; there must be a "use" of the information. 54 Simi-
larly, he might argue that his purchase of William's shares is not "in
connection with the [Consumers Choice] transaction," and, therefore,
Section 5.16 of the Principles of Governance is not applicable." If he
were to prevail in these arguments, he would not be in violation of either
his fiduciary duty or Rule lOb-5.
This possession-use distinction would be eliminated if Proposed
Rule lOb5-1, which was proposed in December 1999, is adopted. Pro-
posed Rule lOb-5(a) provides that "manipulative and deceptive devices"
prohibited by Rule lOb-5 include "the purchase or sale of a security of
any issuer, on the basis of material nonpublic information about that
security or issuer, in breach of a duty of trust or confidence that is owed
directly, indirectly, or derivatively, to the issuer of that security or the
shareholders of that issuer, or to any other person who is the source of
the material nonpublic information." Proposed Rule l0b5-1(b) states
that the "on the basis of' material nonpublic information element of
Proposed Rule l0bS-l(a) is satisfied when a person trades while merely
"aware" of material nonpublic information.56
Proposed Rule 10b5-1(c) would provide several affirmative
defenses to the rule regarding trading "on the basis of' material nonpub-
lic information.57 Robert would have an affirmative defense if he could
demonstrate "that before becoming aware of the information, [he]: (A)
had entered into a binding contract to purchase ... the security in the
amount, at the price, and on the date which [he] purchased.., the secur-
ity." Robert could not demonstrate this affirmative defense, and there-
fore, under the standard in Proposed Rule lOb5-1, he would likely have
54. See, e.g., U. S. v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1066-69 (9th Cir. 1998) (mere possession of
inside information is insufficient to establish violation of insider trading prohibitions); SEC v.
Adler, 137 F.3d 1325, 1337-39(11th Cir. 1998) (10b-5 entails a "use" requirement). But see U.S.
v. Teicher, 987 F.2d 112, 119 (2d Cir. 1993) (suggesting that proof of "knowing possession" is
information sufficient to sustain insider trading prosecution without proof that investor actually
"used" such in formulating trade).
55. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 32.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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Rule lOb-5 liability, notwithstanding the confidentiality agreement,
which probably would not shield him. Art Fleischer expressed the view
that this situation would constitute a "Rule 1Ob-5 violation because Rob-
ert is in possession of insider information."
IX. SEVENTH ISSUE: FACILITATING THE CLIENT'S BREACH OF
FIDUCIARY DUTY IN PURCHASING
OTHER SHAREHOLDER'S SHARES
Patricia Black represents Robert Bottomline in the purchase of Wil-
liam Bottomline's stock and she faces questions of whether, by her
silence, she participated in a client's breach of fiduciary duty or viola-
tion of Rule lOb-5. Further, she may have violated Rule 1.2 (d) and
Rule 4.1(b) of the ABA Model Rules. 8
With respect to Patricia Black's potential liability under Rule 1Ob-
5, in Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank,59 the Supreme
Court held that there is no aiding and abetting liability in a private civil
action under Rule lOb-5. Therefore, Patricia Black does not have any
risk of aiding and abetting liability in a suit by William Bottomline.
However, under Section 20(1) of the 34 Act the SEC has the authority to
seek injunctive relief and certain monetary penalties against "any person
that knowingly provides substantial assistance to another person [i.e.,
aids or abets] in violation of a provision of the [34 Act] or of any rule or
regulation issued [thereunder] . . ."6 Thus, Patricia Black may be
exposing herself to a potential SEC enforcement action for aiding and
abetting a violation by Robert of Rule lOb-5.
In addition, in Central Bank, the Court acknowledged that a secon-
dary actor like Patricia Black can be held liable as a primary actor if she
"employs a manipulative device or makes a material misstatement (or
omission) on which a purchaser or seller of securities relies."61 Thus,
Black could be subject to liability under Rule lOb-5 if in the course of
representing Robert she makes a material omission.
Prior to the decision in Central Bank to the effect that there is no
aiding and abetting liability under Rule lOb-5, the court in SEC v.
National Student Marketing Corp.62 found that the lawyers for a target
firm had aiding and abetting liability under Rule lOb-5. In National
Student Marketing, the lawyers for a target permitted a merger to close
even though the "comfort letter" of the acquiror's accountants, which
58. See MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra note 2, Rule 1.2(d) & Rule 4.1(b).
59. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
60. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 20(e).
61. Central Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 191.
62. 457 F. Supp. 682, 715 (D.D.C. 1978).
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was a condition to closing, indicated that the acquiror's financials were
materially defective.63 The court stated the SEC's position as follows:
The Commission contends that the [target's] attorneys should have
refused to issue the opinions in view of the adjustments revealed by
the unsigned comfort letter, and after receipt of the signed version,
they should have withdrawn their opinion with regard to the merger
and demanded resolicitation of the [target's] shareholders. If the [tar-
get's] directors refused, the attorneys should have withdrawn from
the representation and informed the shareholders or the Commission
64
Also, the SEC charged the law firm of the target's attorneys with
"vicarious liability for the actions of [the attorneys] with respect to
[their] activities on behalf of the firm." 65
Although the court refused to issue an injunction, the court found
that the target's attorneys "had a duty to the [target's] shareholders to
delay the closing of the merger pending disclosure and resolicitation
with corrected financials, and that the breach of that duty constituted a
breach of the antifraud provisions through aiding and abetting the
merger transaction. 66
It is possible that under a similar set of circumstances arising today
a court could find that the target's attorneys were primary violators of
Rule lOb-5 because the line between a primary violation and a secon-
dary violation is difficult to discern.67 Further, as pointed out by Profes-
sor Prentice,
the Supreme Court has held that a duty to disclose will exist if there
is a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence
between' plaintiff and defendant. Therefore, at the very least,
accountants and other collateral defendants owe a duty to blow the
whistle to warn third parties of their client's fraud when they owe a
fiduciary duty to those third parties.6 8
Under a fact pattern similar to that in National Student Marketing,
it is possible that the target's attorneys would be found to be primary
violators of Rule 1Ob-5.
Although in National Student Marketing the action was against the
target's lawyers, in the hypothetical Patricia Black is representing the
63. See id. at 709.
64. Id. at 701. Significantly, the court did not embrace the SEC's position that the lawyers
might have had a duty to "blow the whistle" outside the corporate family context, i.e., to the
Commission.
65. Id. at 701.
66. Id. at 714.
67. See, e.g., Prentice, supra note 41, at 699.
68. Id. at 766.
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acquiring person, Robert Bottomline, and we assume that competent
counsel represents William Bottomline. Thus, the issue here is similar
to the issue raised in National Student Marketing where the SEC brought
an action against the counsel for the acquiror and his law firm in the
matter. The SEC argued that the acquiror's attorney owed a duty to the
target's shareholders to disclose the materially false financials; however,
the district court did not so hold, and, because of the settlement of the
case, this issue was never decided.6 9 The SEC position is inconsistent
with the current state of the law, which Professor Prentice describes as
follow:
Lawyers are even less likely to owe fiduciary duties to third parties
.... According to most courts, attorneys do not typically owe duties
of disclosure to nonclients and will rarely be liable to third parties for
their legal work unless '[they] prepared a signed "opinion" letter
designed for the use of a third party.' A common view is that
expressed by the Fourth Circuit in Schatz v. Rosenberg that '[t]he
better rule -that attorneys have no duty to "blow the whistle" on their
clients - allows clients to repose complete trust in their lawyers.' 70
In Schatz v. Rosenberg, the seller of a target firm brought a Rule
1Ob-5 action against the law firm of the buyer claiming that the financial
statements of the buyer were fraudulent; that the lawyer knew of the
fraud; and the lawyer failed to disclose the fraud to the seller.71 The
Fourth Circuit found that even if the law firm had violated a state bar
ethical rule, such a violation did not create a duty to disclose under Rule
lOb-5, and therefore, there could be no liability.72 In describing this
decision, Professor Phillips says:
According to the Court of Appeals, the law firm simply 'papered the
deal' and acted as a mere 'scrivener' in putting into writing the terms
to which the parties agreed in preparing the closing documents ....
Therefore, despite the lawyers' actual knowledge of the fraud, they
could remain silent and participate in the closing of the transaction
without liability under either the federal securities laws or Maryland
State law.73
Additionally, Professor Phillips observes that the "law is clear; a
lawyer has no right to disclose client fraud or crime unless it involves
serious bodily injury, and lawyers are not liable for fraud under the fed-
eral securities laws, or otherwise, if they fail to disclose their knowledge
69. JAMES D. Cox, ROBERT W. HILLMAN AND DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES
REGULATION, CASES AND MATERIALS 1048 (2d Ed. 1997).
70. Prentice, supra note 41, at 767-68.
71. See generally 943 F.2d 485 (4th Cir. 1991).
72. 943 F.2d at 498.
73. Richard M. Phillips, Client Fraud and the Securities Lawyer's Duty of Confidentiality, 49
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 823, 825-26 (1992).
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of a client's fraud." 74
On the other hand, in In Re Rospatch Securities Litigation,75 the
court refused to grant the motion for summary judgment by a public
company's law firm that was charged as a primary violator under Rule
lOb-5 for preparing misleading disclosure documents. The law firm
asserted that it did not have a duty to the purchasers of the company's
stock.76 The court held that the law firm's "direct participation in prepa-
ration of documents constitutes 'direct contacts' under the law of the
Sixth Circuit. Accordingly, [the law firm] had a duty to disclose mate-
rial omissions in those documents. 77 The court pointed out that the law
firm's services "were more than the 'daily grist of the mill.' . . . [The
firm's] lawyers had detailed knowledge of [the company's] business and
legal affairs," as distinguished from the facts in Schatz, which was a
pure "tattling" case.78 However, the court pointed out that "Schatz has
been criticized on ethical grounds," and that Professor Hazard, one of
the foremost experts on legal ethics, concluded that "Schatz gives law-
yers a 'license to steal.' "7
Thus, under the current state of the law concerning Rule lOb-5, and
depending on the circuit, Patricia Black could have personal liability if
she represents Robert Bottomline in the transaction, and full disclosure
of the potential sale to Consumers Choice is not made.
Turning to the impact of the ABA Model Rules, Rule 1.2(d) pro-
vides that a "lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a
client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent."8
The Annotations to the Model Rules further provide that "a lawyer may
not knowingly assist a client in criminal or fraudulent conduct."8 How-
ever, Rule 1.2(d) further provides that a "lawyer may discuss the legal
consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may
counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the
validity, scope, meaning or application of law." 82
Rule 4.1(b) provides that a lawyer shall not "knowingly fail to dis-
close a material fact to a third person when disclosure is necessary to
avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client unless disclo-
74. Id. at 826. Also note that in National Student Marketing, the target's shareholders were
relying on the opinion of the target's lawyers, and therefore, this case and these facts would not
appear to fall within the scope of the narrow view expressed in Schatz v. Rosenberg.
75. [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,939 (W.D. Mich. 1992).
76. Id. at 93,978.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 93,979.
79. Id.
80. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra note 2, Rule 1.2(d).
81. Id.
82. Id.
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sure is prohibited by rule 1.6." (Emphasis added.)83 The exceptions to
this rule, which relate to disclosures that are necessary to prevent the
client from committing certain criminal acts involving "imminent death"
or "substantial bodily harm," and disclosures to establish a claim or
defense in a controversy with the client, are not applicable here. How-
ever, the formulation of Rule 1.6 in many states permits the lawyer to
make a disclosure in a broader set of circumstances.84 For example,
Professor Phillips reports that the "Virginia Code of Professional
Responsibility permits a lawyer to disregard the duty of confidentiality
if it is 'clearly established that the client is using the lawyer to perpetu-
ate a fraud or other crime.' "85 He argues that there is a "need for revi-
sion of Model Rule 1.6 and state codes of professional responsibility
which inhibit the lawyer's right to take action to disclose client fraud
involving the use of legal services. '"86
Indeed, the subject of lawyer facilitation of client fraud through
silence and, in particular, the lawyer's discretion or obligation ethically
to blow the whistle on client fraud, continues to be an evolving, contro-
versial topic in the field of legal ethics. For example, Section 117B of
the ALl, Law Governing Lawyers, which permits disclosure to "prevent,
rectify, or mitigate substantial financial loss provides:
(1) A lawyer may use or disclose confidential client information
when and to the extent that the lawyer reasonably believes such use
or disclosure is necessary to prevent a crime or fraud, and (a) the
crime or fraud threatens substantial financial loss to a person; (b) the
loss has not yet occurred; (c) the lawyer's client intends to commit
the crime or fraud either directly or through a third person; and (d)
the client has employed or is employing the lawyer's services in com-
mitting the crime or fraud.87
Subsection (2) provides that if a loss described in Subsection (1)
above has already occurred, "a lawyer may use or disclose confidential
client information when and to the extent that the lawyer reasonably
believes such use or disclosure is necessary to rectify or mitigate the
lOss. ''88 However Subsection (3) requires the lawyer, "if feasible," to
remonstrate with the client before warning the victim or taking other
action to prevent the harm.89
83. Id. at Rule 4.1. Rule 1.6(a) prohibits a lawyer from revealing "information relating to
representation of a client unless the client consents." Id. at Rule 1.6(a).
84. Phillips, supra note 73, at 827-28.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 830.
87. ALI, Law Governing Lawyers, Section 117B.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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Similarly, Proposed Rule 1.6 of the Public Discussion Draft of the
ABA's Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Con-
duct, known informally as "Ethics 2000," 9 would confer discretion on a
lawyer to reveal ethically protected "information relating to the repre-
sentation" without client consent in limited circumstances. First, such
information could be disclosed "to prevent the client from committing a
crime or fraud that is likely to result in substantial injury to the financial
interests or property of another and in furtherance of which the client has
used or is using the lawyer's services." Second, a disclosure could be
made to "rectify or mitigate substantial injury to the financial interests or
property of another resulting from the client's commission of a crime or
fraud in furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer's
services."91
As noted above, however, under Rule 4.1(b), there is no duty to
disclose on the part of the lawyer because the disclosure duty is trumped
and completely prohibited by the lawyer's ethical duty of client confi-
dentiality under the current version of Rule 1.6. This is true even when
the client is engaged in an ongoing fraud. Of course, if the client is
engaged in fraud, the lawyer is ethically precluded from assisting the
client by the current version of Rule 1.2(d), regardless of the fact that the
lawyer may have no liability under Rule lOb-5.
So, this then takes us to withdrawal from representation under Rule
1.16. Rule 1.16(a) provides that "a lawyer... shall withdraw from the
representation of a client if: (1) the representation will result in violation
of the rules of professional conduct or other law . -." On the other
hand, under Rule 1.16(b), the attorney is permitted to resign if the with-
drawal "can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the
interests of the client, or if, [inter alia]: (1) the client persists in a course
of action involving the lawyer's services that the lawyer reasonably
believes is criminal or fraudulent, [or] (3) a client insists upon pursing
an objective that the lawyer considers repugnant or imprudent ....
What should Patricia Black have done, given Rule 1.16(b) and the
unconditional prohibition on counsel's ability to reveal to William Bot-
tomline the Consumers Choice negotiations? Is this a case of permissi-
ble silence (perhaps even mandated silence under Rule 1.6) or an
impermissible concealment or omission of material facts?
The panelists reached different conclusions. Arthur Fleischer says,
90. Proposed Rule 1.6, ABA, Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct, Public Discussion Draft (1999) [hereinafter Ethics 2000].
91. Id.
92. ABA MODEL RULES ANN., Rule 1.16, supra note 2.
93. Id.
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from the point of view of the lawyer, there is a "disciplinary rule that
says the lawyer cannot engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit or misrepresentation." When there is a "serious issue about a vio-
lation of 1Ob-5, which is fraud or deceit, the lawyer could not participate
in that conduct." He further says that Robert would have to disclose to
William the "status and details of the negotiations with Consumers
Choice, before the lawyer could proceed." Alternatively, Robert Mund-
heim says that there "may be reasons not to disclose the deal with Con-
sumers Choice, but Robert should in such case set aside a portion of the
price so that when the deal is consummated, Robert will give William
the higher price." Ed Labaton agrees that in his view the lawyer "should
set aside a good portion of his or her fee, because the lawyer has a
disclosure obligation." He adds that, "in the Third Circuit, lawyers can
be directly liable under Rule lOb-5 as a primary violators."94 If the
"attorney has a material fact, namely that there is another several million
dollars available for William Bottomline, the attorney has a real
problem."
Chancellor Allen asserted that the purchase of William's shares
would be a "clear violation of fiduciary obligations Robert Bottomline
has to William Bottomline, and that although there may be good reasons
not to disclose, the question is if the rest of the deal price is going to be
a satisfactory remedy in view of the very unclear recessionary damages
concept in Delaware." He further says that if there is a "clear breach of
fiduciary duty, then there is a risk under Delaware law that Robert could
be hammered with a remedy that was greater than the deal price."
But Bob Mundheim commented that if "Consumers Choice is legit-
imately requiring that the negotiations be kept confidential, there must
be a way to permit this to be done." Chancellor Allen responded that
one alternative is for Robert Bottomline "to not go forward, that is, to
abstain under the 'disclose or abstain' from trading principle under Rule
lOb-5." But Bob Mundheim then asked, "What if William Bottomline
wants to do the deal immediately?"
James Freund stated "the solution to the ethical dilemma is to give
William Bottomline price protection, by providing in the deal that if
Robert Bottomline sells within the next six months to a year, William
will get the higher price." This would be the "practical solution to this
problem, and if "Robert doesn't want to disclose the issue to William
Bottomline, the matter is by definition material."
Anthony Alfieri asks whether or not the price protection feature
"vitiates the lawyer's duty to correct the misapprehension that William
94. See generally, Klein v. Boyd, No. 97-1143, 97-1261, 1998 WL 55245 (3d Cir. Feb. 12,
1998), rehearing in banc granted, judgment vacated on Mar. 9, 1998.
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Bottomline is going to sue on." Both James Freund and Arthur
Fleischer agreed that the price protection feature should eliminate the
disclosure obligation in this situation. James Freund also pointed out
that the confidentiality agreement may prohibit disclosure. Arthur
Fleischer, however, responded that the confidentiality agreement will
likely contain an exception for disclosures required by law. Addition-
ally, in the circumstance in which Robert Bottomline will share in the
proceeds he realizes on the sale to Consumers Choice, there is "no
fraud."
X. EIGHTH ISSUE: DISCLOSING ONE CLIENT'S CONFIDENTIAL
INFORMATION TO ANOTHER CLIENT
Was attorney Patricia Black's disclosure to firm client, Robert Bot-
tomline, of the developer-client's plans in violation of her ethical duty
under Rule 1.6 not to reveal such information without the developer's
consent, even though the disclosure was made to Robert who, in his
capacity as a shareholder of Technology, has given up his interest in the
Technology stock to Consumers Choice? Patricia Black's receipt of this
information pits the attorney's ethical commitment of confidentiality to
the developer-client against her ethical duties of loyalty and communica-
tion to disclose material information to the Technology client.
Regardless, there was uniform agreement among the panelists that
Patricia Black should not have made the disclosure.
XI. NINTH ISSUE: LAWYER'S OBLIGATION TO A NON-CLIENT
Was attorney Patricia Black required to disclose to a non-client,
Consumers Choice, the material information regarding the developer's
plans for the real estate that Robert is buying from Technology? If not
required to make such a disclosure, was she ethically permitted to do so?
Or, as an ethical matter, was she prohibited from doing so? In this
regard, it should be noted that she acted as counsel for Technology in the
transaction.
Rule 1.13(a) provides that a "lawyer employed or retained by an
organization represents the organization acting through its duly author-
ized constituents."95 Thus, it is clear that Black's loyalty in the transac-
tion was to Technology. At the time of "the trade" however, Robert
Bottomline owned 100% of Technology's shares, although these shares
would later be transferred to Consumers Choice. Did Technology really
lose? Did attorney Patricia Black breach any duty owed to Technology
95. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra note 2, Rule 1.13(a).
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when she facilitated Robert Bottomline's purchase of Technology's real
estate?
Although the entity-representation theory reflected in Rule 1.13(a)
is deeply rooted in our system's approaches to analyzing conflicts of
interest and other ethical issues, the entity theory offers little guidance
here. Who is Patricia Black's client? And, what is the significance, if
any, of the fact that Consumers Choice's acquisition of Technology is
imminent? Further, does Robert Bottomline have any potential liability
under Rule lOb-5? Does this constitute a failure to disclose material
inside information in connection with the sale of securities? If so, has
Patricia Black also violated Rule 10b-5?
Arthur Fleischer says that Patricia Black cannot represent Technol-
ogy in making the purchase because of the contract with Consumers
Choice. He says that there is "no way Black could talk about the trans-
action with Consumers Choice without lying." Furthermore, the
purchase of the property might give rise to a claim by Consumers
Choice that there was a violation of Rule lOb-5 for Robert Bottomline to
purchase the property without giving Consumers Choice full notice of
the developer's plans. Arguably, however, this was not fraud "in con-
nection" with the purchase and sale of a security.
James Freund questioned whether in this situation there is a duty to
disclose to Consumers Choice, and he suggested that Robert might give
Consumers Choice a "heads up" that there may be something happening
and let Consumers Choice do its own investigation. But Edward
Labaton and Robert Mundheim agree that this would be a misrepresenta-
tion in and of itself.
Anthony Alfieri raised the option of "noisy withdrawal" by Patricia
Black if Robert Bottomline insists on proceeding with the purchase.
Chancellor Allen agreed that any withdrawal in a transaction like this
would be a noisy withdrawal.
The general consensus of the panelists was that even though Patri-
cia Black communicated the information to Robert Bottomline, she can-
not represent him without violating Rule 4.1(a), i.e., "knowingly"
making a "false statement of material fact to a third person."96
XH. TENTH ISSUE: REPRESENTING BOTH THE TARGET
AND THE ACQUIROR
The partners of Stone & Cold argue that since Wachtell Lipton has
represented both firms in the $30 billion acquisition by Banc One of
First Chicago, Stone & Cold should be able to do the same as long as the
96. Id. at Rule 4.1.
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clients, ALO and Consumers Choice, have no problem and give their
consent. Also, Silk & Stockings is prepared to move forward with the
dual representation, because they have often done so with appropriate
firewalls between the teams of bankers working for the two sides.
The starting point for the analysis of whether Stone & Cold can
undertake this dual representation is Rule 1.7.97 This rule prohibits a
lawyer from representing a "client if the representation of that client will
be directly adverse to another client, unless: (1) the lawyer reasonably
believes the representation will not adversely affect the relationship with
the other client; and (2) each client consents after consultation."98 The
Annotations to the Model Rules explain that, "[1]oyalty is an essential
element in the lawyer's relationship to a client," and "loyalty to a client
prohibits undertaking representation directly adverse to that client with-
out the client's consent." 99
Although the two clients are prepared to give their consent, the
Annotations to the Model Rules provide that "when a disinterested law-
yer would conclude that the client should not agree to the representation
under the circumstances, the lawyer involved cannot properly ask for
such agreement or provide representation on the basis of the seller's
consent."' Thus, as a threshold matter Stone & Cold, acting in their
capacity as "disinterested lawyers," would have to determine that under
the circumstances, Consumers Choice and ALO should not withhold
their consent. It is difficult to see how Stone & Cold could act in the
capacity of disinterested lawyers in this regard. Would Stone & Cold
have to consult with a truly disinterested lawyer to make this determina-
tion? Furthermore, is it not likely that a truly disinterested lawyer would
determine that the clients should not agree to dual representation when
dealing with a public company acquisition such as this one, where the
parties have not yet agreed on price. It would appear that Stone & Cold
would have a difficult time negotiating this first hurdle. In this connec-
tion, the New York Times reports that in the Banc One-First Chicago
transaction, "Wachtell was not called until after Banc One and First Chi-
"9101cago negotiated most of the details themselves, including price ....
In regard to the absence of an agreement on price, the Annotations
to the Model Rules say, "a lawyer may not represent multiple parties to a
negotiation whose interests are fundamentally antagonistic to each other,
but common representation is permissible where the clients are generally
97. Id. at Rule 1.7.
98. Id.
99. Id. at Rule 1.7.
100. Id.
101. It Takes 2 to Merge, supra note 4.
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aligned in interest even though there is some difference of interest
among them."'' 0 2
Obviously, if Stone & Cold undertakes the dual representation,
appropriate firewalls will have to be developed between the lawyers in
the firm representing the two sides. Also, if they undertake the dual
representation and, for example, the parties are not able to agree on the
exchange ratio or a third party makes a competing offer for one of the
merging firms, the interest of the two parties may become fundamentally
inconsistent. In such circumstances the Annotations to the Model Rules
provide that, "if a conflict arises after representation has been under-
taken, the lawyer should withdraw from the representation."1 °3 In other
circumstances, the lawyer may have to withdraw from representing both
parties.
Stone & Cold might negotiate at the outset with ALO and Consum-
ers Choice regarding which of the two firms it will cease to represent in
the event of a conflict developing. This mechanism was used by the law
firm of Brown, Wood, Fuller, Caldwell and Ivey ("Brown Wood"),
which represented both Merrill Lynch and two of its managers in an
action by the SEC charging both Merrill and the managers with a failure
to supervise.' 0 4 Brown Wood explained to the managers that it had a
long-standing representation of Merrill, and that "if a conflict of interest
appeared to develop, Brown Wood would have to withdraw as [the man-
ager's] counsel and that, in turn, if a respondent felt that there was diver-
gence of interest 'he need only advise us and we would withdraw."'"0 5
The Administrative Law Judge permitted the dual representation to pro-
ceed on the assumption that the decision of the managers was an
"informed" decision."0 6 The judge reasoned that this approach "is con-
sistent with the precept that a litigant's choice of counsel is an extremely
important right which should not be denied him, absent considerations
compelling a contrary conclusion .... 07
Given the many unforeseen events that can occur in a public com-
pany acquisition where there is an absence of an agreement on price, it
seems prudent for Stone & Cold not to undertake the dual representa-
tion; and that under the circumstances, a "disinterested lawyer" would
conclude that the client should not agree to the representation."18
102. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT.
103. Id.
104. Matter of Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1973-74 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,608, at 83,631 (A.L.J. 1973).
105. Id. at 83,633.
106. Id. at 83,631.
107. Id. at 83,634.
108. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT.
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Regarding dual representation by lawyers and investment bankers, in
this connection, the New York Times quotes Professor Samuel Hayes, a
finance professor at the Harvard Business School, saying, "I'm a direc-
tor, and I would never let someone be on both sides of the table. I find
that so contrary to my perception about the way things should work."10 9
Although dual representation by investment bankers seems to be more
common than dual representation by lawyers, the New York Times
reports that in the Wells Fargo-Norwest transaction, "Goldman dis-
patched two separate teams, one for each company, and Credit Suisse
First Boston, a unit of CS HOLDING, was hired by Wells Fargo to give a
fairness opinion, for some added assurance."' 10
Panelist Joseph Flom said, in representing both sides, Skadden
Arps has gone through "elaborate procedures, making certain that sepa-
rate counsel would be "on the scene" for any issue that could be really
controversial between the two sides." Also, he said Skadden would
ensure that the clients "understand the implications of representing both
sides, and would have elaborate internal procedures ensuring that infor-
mation is not passed to the wrong person." He further stated, "if the
waiver is right you really don't have a problem because both the parties
are assuming you have all [relevant] information." However, he indi-
cated, that the issue could also be determined by the kind of work the
attorney was doing. For example, in some transactions, the general
counsel may be running the deal; or the attorneys "might not be involved
in the price negotiation" or in the negotiation of "price sensitive issues."
In any event, Joseph Flom would insist that both clients have indepen-
dent counsel if some major dispute arises.
As a justification for dual representations in certain circumstances,
he said that he is reminded of a statement made by Justice Brandeis that
there is "such a thing as an attorney for the situation." Lastly, Joseph
Flom jokingly added that a senior partner in one of New York's large
law firms said in response to a question concerning dual representation
that, "it is not representing both sides that worries me, it is representing
neither." The bottom line is that Joseph Flom would agree to represent
the two clients if they insisted on it.
Arthur Fleischer's concern is first, whether there is an "informed
waiver," and second, whether the firm can "effectively represent both
clients." He says, "generally there would be no need for a back up coun-
sel in a merger-of-equals ("MOE"), like the one here, because there is "a
coincidence of interest." Therefore, in a true MOE, there should be no
problem with dual representation. He pointed out, however, that the law
109. It Takes 2 to Merge, supra note 4.
110. Id.
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firm should have "separate teams, and should insure that each board was
aware that the firms had common counsel."
Although a law firm can represent both sides, Arthur Fleischer does
not advise doing it. Further, he would really advise against doing so in a
family owned firm where there could be competing interests." "There
are no bright line or axiomatic test in this area," and therefore, the area
has to be "approached carefully."
Robert Mundheim asked whether or not it matters if you have the
same investment banker. He suggested that it would be "easier if the
firms had separate investment banking firms to focus on the pricing
issue."
James Freund mentioned the idea of "counsel for the situation," in
which two firms hired one investment banker to help them decide upon
the deal. In addition, both parties hired separate investment bankers to
give fairness opinions. The separate bankers each advised their client
that the price was unfair. As a result, both sides "turned on the middle
man, the deal folded, and the middleman was out of a job." His bottom
line is that "it is very tough to be in the middle." Jokingly, he said in
this situation he would "try to find out who was going to end up [in
control] and represent that person."
Lewis Kaden asked whether the attorney could get involved in the
technical detail regarding the management of the combined company,
even though both parties want the lawyer to act as a mediator, and be
counsel "for the situation." James Freund cautioned that, if things go
wrong the client could claim that the "informed consent does not cover
the circumstance that has arisen." Informed consent may solve the basic
"ethical problem," but the burden on just what is informed consent shifts
to the lawyer.
For Edward Labaton, there are "situations in which even with
informed consent the lawyer cannot proceed." He gives the following
example: What if the lawyer discovers a slight understatement in the
earnings of one of the companies? Is the lawyer barred from telling the
other client about that fact which may or may not have an affect on the
price of the stock? And what happens if a law suit develops six months
later as a result of the understatement?
XIII. ELEVENTH IssuE: ARE SUCCESS FEES PERMISSIBLE IN
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS TRANSACTIONS?
Steve and Jenny both read the recent Wall Street Journal article
about Cravath's success fee in the Time Warner-AOL transaction and
think it is a good idea for Stone & Cold in this deal. The Journal article
reports that Cravath's fee for representing Time Warner in the transac-
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tion could be $35 million." 1 Another Journal article reports fees in the
amount of $50 million could be earned by each of Time Warner's
investment bankers.1 12 Thus, lawyers' fees are moving closer to those
of the investment bankers.
The starting point in analyzing whether Stone & Cold can under-
take this representation on the basis of a success fee is Rule 1.5 of the
Model Rules. Rule 1.5(a) sets the general rule that a lawyer's fee must
be "reasonable," and sets out factors for determining the reasonableness
of fees, including the time spent on the matter and the skill required.'
13
Rule 1.5(c) provides that a fee may be "contingent on the outcome of the
matter for which the service is rendered:" some exceptions exists, but
none are relevant here.114 The contingent fee arrangement must be in
writing, "must state the method by which the fee is to be determined,"
and upon conclusion of the matter, the lawyer is required to provide the
client with an accounting statement." 15
In an informal opinion, the ABA Committee of Ethics and Profes-
sional Responsibility held that the lawyer normally has an obligation to
offer a prospective client an alternative fee arrangement before
accepting a matter on a contingent fee basis. 116 Here, the client is well
aware of Stone & Cold's normal fee practices and has suggested the
contingent fee arrangement. There is nothing in the Model Rules that
prohibits Stone & Cold from entering into the success fee arrangement.
It should be noted that the contingent fee is subject to the reasonableness
standard set out in Rule 1.5(a) and that a court might find that the fee is
unreasonable if only a small amount of work is performed by the
attorney. 117
In discussing attorney's fees, Lewis Kaden asked whether the attor-
ney could take stock options as part of the fee. Chancellor Allen
responded that lawyers are not bound to a per hour fee basis, and many
factors go into determining the reasonableness of the fee. Moreover,
"assuming informed sophisticated clients there should not be a problem
with a success fee." However, options present special problems if the
"incentive structure of the fee impairs the independent judgment of the
attorney." There is nothing wrong "in principle or ethically with some
111. Cravath, Swaine & Moore, supra note 5.
112. See Randall Smith, Did Success Rob Goldman of AOL Deal?, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 2000,
at Cl.
113. MODEL RUtLES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra note 2, Rule 1.5.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 86-1521 (1986).
See generally MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT.
117. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra note 2, Rule 1.5.
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sort of incentive compensation, but on a case-by-case basis a judgment
has to be made that independence of judgment will not be impaired by
the size of the potential success fee."
Justice Moore asserts that "a contingent fee where the investment
banker is going to have to give a fairness opinion must be avoided."
James Freund agreed, in that an investment banker giving a fairness
opinion and receiving a success fee may not be believed by the client.
He adds, "a lot of the advice you give a client is toward getting a deal
done, whether there is a fixed or contingent fee," but the "client may get
in his or her head that maybe the lawyer's advice is tainted by the con-
tingent fee."
Edward Labaton stated that the client should "understand that the
lawyer is obviously going to be affected by a contingent fee, consciously
or unconsciously." Arthur Fleischer on the other hand, says that if "the
lawyer thinks that he or she can give the same advice without regard to
the structure of the fee, the lawyer should not have a problem going
forward." He adds that the nature of the client has to be factored into the
analysis. For example, companies with sophisticated inside counsel,
should have no problems with contingent fees; a "disinterested lawyer
may conclude that an experienced sophisticated client could do certain
things that a less experienced client could not." Joseph Flom said, and
Arthur Fleischer agreed, that the advisability of a contingent fee may be
dependent on what percentage the contingent fee is of the firm's reve-
nues, . . . and a "contingent fee should be okay as long as it is not a
material part of the firm's revenues."
Professor John Coffee raises the insider trading problem inherent in
this situation. For example, if the lawyer knows the regulatory environ-
ment has become more favorable, but the client perceives great regula-
tory risk, there is a problem of "asymmetric information, which is a lot
like insider trading." He believes there should be a "continuing obliga-
tion on the lawyer to disclose how little or how much risk there may be
in a particular situation." Chancellor Allen said that in all situations the
consent of the client must be "informed consent;" therefore the client
must be fully informed so "there is no asymmetric information" and the
client is not being "coerced."
In both the dual representation and the contingent fee issues, Barry
Alberts raised the issue of "whether there are issues as to which a lawyer
ought not be able to act even with the informed consent of the client,
even in the context of very sophisticated clients with significant in-house
capabilities?" He suggested that there are "points at which the lawyer
ought to be inhibited, notwithstanding consent .... for certain core val-
ues of the legal profession, i.e., lawyerly independence, loyalty, confi-
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dentiality, may trump another core value, i.e., client autonomy. He
further asked, "how can the lawyer be simultaneously loyal to both sides
when the interest by definition cannot be entirely and completely coinci-
dent? "If there is no expectation of confidentiality and no expectation of
loyalty, then the question is whether the lawyer is really acting as a
lawyer."
XIV. THIRTEENTH ISSUE: THE LAWYER'S RESPONSE TO AN
ExEcUTIVE'S POSSIBLE BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
Can the lawyers for Consumers Choice merely accept this deal on
salary? What if they have a reasonable suspicion that the primary reason
Jenny Sharpeye gave in on the request for fifty-five percent for her
shareholders was the increase in her salary, thereby violating her fiduci-
ary duty to the shareholders? Who do the lawyers represent: the firm,
the shareholders, Jenny Sharpeye? What is the impact, if any, of Rule
1.13, pertaining to organizations as clients? What are the lawyer's
responsibilities with respect to this issue under the federal securities
laws?
The starting point in analyzing this ethical issue is Rule 1.13(b). 1I8
This rule provides in part that "[i]f a lawyer for an organization knows
an officer, employee or other person associated with the organization is
engaged in action ...that is a violation of a legal obligation to the
organization.., and is likely to result in substantial injury to the organi-
zation, the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably in the best interest of
the organization."' 19 The rule further provides that "[i]n determining
how to proceed, the lawyer shall give due consideration to [inter alia]
the seriousness of the violation and its consequences."1 20 Measures
taken by the lawyer may include, among others,
(1) asking for reconsideration of the matter; (2) advising that a sepa-
rate legal opinion on the matter be sought for presentation to appro-
priate authority in the organization; and (3) referring the matter to
higher authority in the organization, including, if warranted by the
seriousness of the matter, referral to the highest authority that can act
in behalf of the organization as determined by applicable law." 121
In terms of this rule, it seems clear that if Stone & Cold has reason
to believe that Jenny Sharpeye, in agreeing to the higher salary and price
concession, has breached her fiduciary duties to Consumers Choice and
its shareholders, Stone & Cold should: (1) ask Jenny Sharpeye to recon-
118. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra note 2, Rule 1.13.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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sider the arrangement; and if that does not succeed, (2) bring the matter
to the attention of the board. If Stone & Cold does not take this course
of action, or if it does and there is not an appropriate response from the
board, then under Rule 1.16(a)(1), it would appear that Stone & Cold
would have an obligation to withdraw, because the "representation will
result in violation of the rules of professional conduct, i.e., prohibition in
Rule 1.2(d) against assisting a client in a fraud, or other violation of law,
i.e., violation of fiduciary duty and disclosure duty under Rule lOb-
5 ."122
If the breach of fiduciary duty is not corrected and the transaction
goes forward without full disclosure of the background of the increased
salary and price concession, there would arguably be a misstatement of
material fact in the proxy statement. This could potentially result in
liability for Stone & Cold under Rule lOb-5 or Rule 14a-9, the antifraud
provision relating to proxy statements, if it is found that Stone & Cold
has a duty to disclose to the shareholders of Consumers Choice. Stone
& Cold seems to be in the same position as the lawyers to the target firm
in the National Student Marketing case and it is conceivable that a court
could find that Stone & Cold is a primary violator of Rule lOb-5.
Stone & Cold should also be concerned about possible sanctions by
the S.E.C. Pursuant to the S.E.C.'s Rules of Practice, Rule 102(e) pro-
vides that the S.E.C. may "censure a person" or deny the person the right
of practicing before it, if the S.E.C. finds, after notice and opportunity
for hearing, that the person has, inter alia, "willfully violated, or will-
fully aided and abetted the violation of any provision of the Federal
securities laws or the rules or regulations thereunder."' 1 23
Alternatively, the SEC may take action under Section 15(c)(4) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 against a person that has violated
certain disclosure provisions. This provision applies if, after notice and
opportunity for hearing, the S.E.C. finds that "any person subject to the
provisions of [inter alia the proxy and tender offer rules] has failed to
comply with any such provision, rule or regulation in any material
respect"1 24 In such instances, the S.E.C. may "issue an order requiring
such person, and any person who was a cause of the failure to comply
due to an act or omission the person knew or should have known would
contribute to the failure [1] to comply, or [2] to take steps to effect com-
pliance, with such provision or such rule or regulation."' 25
122. ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-366
(1992) (discussing withdrawal when a lawyer's services will otherwise be used to perpetuate a
fraud).
123. SEC Procedural Rules, 17 C.F.R. § 201.102 (1999).
124. Rule 15c-4, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a.
125. Id.
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In addition, the S.E.C. may bring a cease and desist proceeding
under Section 21C of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.126 Under
Section 21C(a), if after notice and an opportunity for hearing, the S.E.C.
finds:
that any person is violating, has violated, or is about to violate any
provision of the [federal securities laws] or any rule or regulation
thereunder, the [S.E.C.] may publish its findings and enter an order
requiring such person, and any other person that is, was, or would be
a cause of the violation, due to an act or omission the person knew or
should have known would contribute to such violation, to cease and
desist from committing or causing such violation and any future vio-
lation of the same provision, rule or regulation. 127
The order may require the person "to comply or to take steps to
effect compliance," and may "require future compliance or steps to
effect future compliance" 128 Under Section 21C(c), in certain circum-
stances the S.E.C. may issue a temporary cease and desist order without
notice and opportunity for a prior hearing. 129
It is instructive to look more closely at two very visible S.E.C.
actions under Rule 102(e) and Section 15(c)(4). In In the Matter of
George C. Kern, Jr. (Allied Stores Corp.), the S.E.C. brought an action
under Section 15(c)(4) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 against
an attorney of a target company for violation of Rule 14d-9 disclosure
rules for tender offers.130 The S.E.C. charged that target lawyer with
failure to disclose, in response to the target offer that (1) it was in nego-
tiations with a "white knight" which would result in a sale of a "material
amount" of the target's assets and a "material change" in the target's
capitalization or result in an "extraordinary transaction," (2) the target
and the white knight reached an agreement in principle to merge, and (3)
the target's board adopted a resolution authorizing the execution of a
merger agreement with the white knight. 131 The Administrative Law
Judge pointed out that under Rule 14d-9(b), the target was required to
disclose "promptly" any "material change" in the information set forth
126. Section 21C, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a. The Senate Report to
the Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, which added Section
21C to the 1934 Act, explains that a "cease and desist order ... will provide a more effective
remedy than is currently available under Section 15(c)(4)." S. Rep. No. 101-337 at 18 (1990).
The Senate Report to the Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990,
which added Section 21C to the 34 Act, explains that a "cease-and-desist order.., will provide a
more effective remedy than is currently available under Section 15(c)(4).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. SEC Admin. Proceeding File No. 3-6869 (Nov. 14, 1988), 1988-1989 FED SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 84,342 [hereinafter Kern].
131. Id. at 89,580.
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in its Schedule 14D-9.132 Applying the probability-magnitude test of
materiality of merger negotiations set out by the Supreme Court in Basic
Incorporated v. Levinson, the Judge found that each of the facts was
material and should have been disclosed. 133 Although the Administra-
tive Law Judge found a violation, the full SEC vacated the decision on
the grounds that it did not have the power to issue general prospective
compliance orders under Section 15(c)(4).134 Professor Coffee and his
coauthors explain this was a retreat from prior S.E.C. positions, and the
"retreat appeared to have been based on the new 'cease and desist' pow-
ers that the Congress gave [the S.E.C.] in 1990 under the Remedies Act
[see Section 21C], which expressly authorized administrative orders
against future violations of any provision, rule, or regulation."' 135 Thus,
in a similar situation, it could be expected that the S.E.C. would proceed
under Section 21C rather than under Section 15(c)(4), and it is, there-
fore, instructive to review the facts and substantive holding of the
Administrative Law Judge in that matter. Applying the substantive
holding of Kern to the facts in the hypothetical, if the increased salary
for Jenny were linked with the concession on price and this was a mate-
rial fact, and if Stone & Cold does not take appropriate steps to ensure
that the fact is properly disclosed, it could be open to a cease and desist
order under Section 21C without respect to whether it is liable.
In In re Carter and Johnson, the S.E.C. brought an action under the
predecessor of Rule 102(e) against two attorneys who represented an
issuer in a public offering that contained a material misrepresentation. 36
The S.E.C. charged two lawyers of a publicly traded company "with
failing to carry out their professional responsibilities with respect to
appropriate disclosure to all concerned, including stockholders, directors
and the investing public ... and thus knowingly engaging in unethical
and improper professional conduct" which is prohibited by Rule 102(e)
and its predecessor. 37 The lawyers urged the CEO of the issuer to make
a proper disclosure of problems with its lease maintenance plan, but the
CEO refused to follow the lawyers' advice, and as a result the issuer
made several material misrepresentations in public documents.'33 The
Administrative Law Judge found that both attorneys had failed to carry
out their professional responsibilities as charged. 139 The S.E.C. reversed
132. Id. at 89,582.
133. See id. at 89,585, (citing Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988)).
134. Id. at 89,583.
135. JENNINGS, MARSH, COFFEE, & SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 1524 (1998).
136. SEC Release No. 17,597 (1981), FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,847 at 84,169 [hereinafter
Carter].
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 84,172.
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the judgment of the Administrative Law Judge, finding that the "ethical
and professional responsibilities of lawyers who become aware that their
client is engaging in violations of the securities laws have not been so
firmly and unambiguously established."' 140 The S.E.C. went on to say,
however, that the "attorneys' conduct raises serious questions about the
obligations of securities lawyers, and the Commission is hereby giving
notice of its interpretation of 'ethical or improper professional conduct'
as that term is used in [the predecessor of Rule 102(e)].''
I The S.E.C. explained that the focus of its concern was on the "pro-
fessional obligation of the lawyer who gives essentially correct disclo-
sure advice to a client that does not follow that advice and as a result
violates the federal securities laws.' 42 In response to this issue, the
S.E.C. set out the following circumstances that are considered "unethical
or improper professional conduct" if engaged in by a lawyer:
When a lawyer with significant responsibilities in the effectuation of
a company's compliance with the disclosure requirements of the fed-
eral securities laws becomes aware that his client is engaged in a
substantial and continuing failure to satisfy those disclosure require-
ments, his continued participation violates professional standards
unless he takes prompt steps to end the client's noncompliance.' 43
In addition, the lawyer is in the "best position to choose the next
step;" resignation may be an option in certain circumstances; and a
direct approach to the board, a member of the board, or to another mem-
ber of the issuer's management may be appropriate. 44 In conclusion,
"[w]hat is required, in short, is some prompt action that leads to the
conclusion that the lawyer is engaged in efforts to correct the underlying
problem, rather than having capitulated to the desires of a strong-willed,
but misguided, client."1 45
Professor Coffee notes that in Carter, the S.E.C. abandoned its
position in National Student Marketing to the effect that the attorney
should have notified the S.E.C. 14
6
Although the S.E.C. explained that it would apply this new stan-
dard in future proceedings, since 1982 the S.E.C. has followed the prac-
tice of not instituting Rule 102(e) proceedings against lawyers "unless
there has been a prior judicial determination [that] the lawyer has vio-
140. Id. at 84,170.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 84, 172.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See JENNINGS Er AL, supra note 135, at 1509.
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lated the law in connection with the purchase or sale of securities."' 47
Thus, Stone & Cold might face an action by the S.E.C. under Rule
102(e) if there is a finding that the firm has violated Rule lOb-5.
As to the reactions of the panelist, Joseph Flom said that the "only
way to deal with this type of situation is to take the decision on compen-
sation matters away from the person being compensated and place it
with the board." He further said that in litigation this situation gives
rise to potential problems under the "smell test" which judges will
apply. And in this context "if the smell test gets applied [Jenny
Sharpeye] is going to lose." If Jenny is isolated from the consideration
of the issue by the board, the effect of her involvement will be "amelio-
rated," but the court will still be "suspicious."
But Arthur Fleischer expressed the view that if the "board is fully
informed of the issues this should take care of the matter." He further
said that the board process should "cleanse" the matter by giving the
"board the opportunity to review the matter in executive session to
decide in their own minds whether the salary being offered to the CEO
makes sense and more importantly whether the terms of the transaction
make sense."
Joseph Flom also emphasized that the compensation arrangements
may be linked to the determination of price. But if the parties agree first
on price without resolving the compensation issues, the party may be
giving up negotiating leverage.
XV. THIRTEENTH ISSUE: LAW FIRM'S AND INVESTMENT BANKING
FIRM'S POTENTIAL LIABILITY FOR INSIDER TRADING
VIOLATIONS OF EMPLOYEES
The insider-trading scheme in ALO's stock started at Blue & Blood
as a result of the statement by the head of the firm's mergers and acqui-
sitions group to the summer associates. The statement made it clear that
Macro Ware would be making a premium offer for ALO. The statement
did not say whether the offer would be a friendly offer or an unsolicited
tender offer. Macro Ware, however, intended to open with a friendly
offer and then proceed with a hostile tender offer if the friendly proposal
was not successful. Blue & Blood had no procedures in effect to guard
against insider trading, as relied on the honesty and integrity of its
employees.
The insider-trading scheme at Quick & Easy started by an unautho-
rized and unexpected breach of its computer systems that were part of its
147. Greene, Lawyer Disciplinary Proceedings Before the Securities Exchange Commission,
14 SEC REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 168 (1982).
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firewall mechanism. It is clear that Quick & Easy was not negligent in
maintaining the system. The employee who breached the system
learned that Macro Ware was prepared to make a hostile tender offer.
As a result of the insider-trading schemes, the price of ALO's stock
increased from $100 to $110, and as a result of Macro Ware's plan to
make an offer at a forty percent premium over the trading price of the
ALO stock on the day of the offer, Macro Ware was required to offer
$144 per share rather than $140. Macro Ware thus paid an additional
$50 million in acquiring ALO.
This situation raises the issue of how law firms and investment
banking firms can most effectively police and control dissemination
internally of nonpublic client information that may be misused in securi-
ties or other commercial transactions. Law firms and investment bank-
ing firms have an interest in having procedures to control the
dissemination of confidential information because the firm's potential
liability for unauthorized disclosures made by its partners or employees.
We start with a discussion of the potential liability Blue & Blood
and Quick & Easy could face under the 34 Act. First, under Section
20A(a) of the Act,
any person who violates any provision of [the 34 Act] or the rules or
regulations thereunder by purchasing or selling a security while in
possession of material, nonpublic information shall be liable to any
person who, contemporaneously with the purchase or sale of securi-
ties has purchased or sold securities of the same class. 14 8
Section 20A(b)(3) makes it clear that a person is not liable under this
provision "solely by reason of employing another person who is liable
under this section, but the liability of a controlling person under this
section shall be subject to section 20(a)." 149 Section 20(4)(a) provides
that a controlling person
shall be jointly and severally liable with and to the same extent as
[the] controlled person to any person to whom [the] controlled person
is liable, unless the controlling person acted in good faith and did not
directly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of
action. 150
Under Section 20A(a) it is. first necessary to determine whether the
employees of Blue & Blood and Quick & Easy that traded in ALO's
stock have violated any provision of the 34 Act or the rules or regula-
tions thereunder. If the employees have violated any such rule, it is then
148. Section 20(A)(a), Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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necessary to determine whether Blue & Blood or Quick & Easy have
controlling person liability.
As a result of the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
O'Hagan,1 51 the misappropriation theory applies in Rule lOb-5 actions.
This theory ". . . holds that a person commits fraud 'in connection with'
a securities transaction and thereby violates . . . Rule 1Ob-5 when he
misappropriates confidential information for securities trading purposes,
in breach of a duty owed to the source of the information." 152 Both the
employees of Blue & Blood and Quick & Easy have misappropriated
confidential client information; they each have violated Rule lOb-5; and
they each have liability under the "contemporaneous trading" provisions
of Section 20(A).
In addition, the Supreme Court in O'Hagan held that the require-
ment in Rule 14e-3 to "disclose or abstain" from trading under the
tender offer provisions of the Act is a valid exercise of the S.E.C.s'
authority.1 13 This rule applies, "if any person has taken a substantial
step or steps to commence, or has commenced, a tender offer .... ,14
In such instances, Rule 14e-3(a) provides that:
it shall constitute a fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative act or prac-
tice within the meaning of section 14(e) ... for any other person who
is in possession of material information relating to such tender offer
which information he knows or has reason to know is nonpublic and
which he knows or has reason to know has been acquired directly or
indirectly from (1) the offering person.., to purchase or sell or cause
to be purchased or sold any of such securities . . . unless within a
reasonable time prior to any purchase or sale such information and its
source are publicly disclosed by press release or otherwise. 55
Clearly, the employee of Quick & Easy who learned that Macro
Ware was prepared to make a tender offer is also in violation of Rule
14e-3. There is also a strong argument that the summer associate for
Blue & Blood is in violation of Rule 14e-3, even though he may not
have been specifically aware that Macro Ware was prepared to make a
"tender offer," because he was aware that Macro Ware planned to make
an offer. As illustrated in S.E.C. v. Mayhew, where the court found a
violation under Rule 14e-3 even though there was a two month lag
between a tip and a tender offer, courts are likely to interpret the "sub-
stantial step" and "in connection with" elements of Rule 14e-3 very
151. 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
152. Id. at 652.
153. Id. at 674.
154. S.E.C. 1934 Act, Rule 14e-3a.
155. Id.
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broadly. 56
Thus, the employees of both Blue & Blood and Quick & Easy who
engaged in the trading are liable under the misappropriation theory of
Rule lOb-5, and as discussed above, are in violation of Rule 14e-3.
We next turn to the question of whether Blue & Blood or Quick &
Easy are liable for the trading activities of their employees. Starting
with the potential liability of Blue & Blood under Rule 14e-3, Rule 14e-
3(d)(1) provides that it shall be unlawful for, inter alia, an advisor to
Macro Ware to "communicate material nonpublic information relating to
a tender offer to any other person under circumstances in which it is
reasonably foreseeable that such communication is likely to result in a
violation of this section except that this paragraph shall not apply to a
communication made in good faith."'' 57 The issue here is whether the
head of Blue & Blood's M&A department violated this rule in making
the disclosure to the summer associates.
In this connection, it is instructive to note that Section 112(1)(b) of
the ALI, Law Governing Lawyers, requires the lawyer to "take steps
reasonable under the circumstances to protect confidential client infor-
mation against impermissible use or disclosure by the lawyer's associ-
ates or agents that may adversely affect a material interest of the
client."1 58 The comment to this provision says that a
"lawyer must take reasonable steps so that law office personnel and
other agents ... properly handle confidential client information. That
includes devising and enforcing appropriate policies and practices
concerning confidentiality and supervising such personnel in per-
forming those duties... a lawyer must not engage in casual or frivo-
lous conversation about a client's matters that creates an
unreasonable risk of harm to the interests of the client. 59
The Reporters' note to this comment draws a "distinction between
beneficial and justifiable shop-talk within a 'rule of reason' that notes
factors such as need of listener to know, utility of conversation in law-
yer's practice, degree of confidence lawyer can have that client remains
anonymous, and innocuous nature of information."1 60
The ALI standard may have been violated by Blue & Blood's dis-
closure to its summer associates, and by the absence of any clear poli-
cies in place at Blue & Blood concerning such disclosures. Assuming
this to be the case, more weight would be lent to the argument that the
156. 121 F.3d 44 (2d Cir. 1997).
157. Rule 14e-3(d)(1).
158. ALl, Law Governing Lawyers, supra note 87, at 112.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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head of the mergers and acquisitions department violated Rule 14e-
3(d)(1).
With regard to the potential liability of Quick & Easy under Rule
14e-3, Rule 14e-3(b) provides that an investment banking firm will have
no liability if it can show that it had:
"implemented one or a combination of policies and procedures, rea-
sonable under the circumstances, taking into consideration the nature
of the person's business, to ensure that individuals making invest-
ment decisions would not violate [the disclose or abstain rule]."
The policies and procedures may include, inter alia, "those which
prevent such individual(s) from knowing such information."161
Also, Section 15(f) of the 34 Act requires every broker or dealer to
"establish, maintain and enforce written policies and procedures reason-
ably designed... to prevent the misuse... of material, nonpublic infor-
mation." '62  Assuming that Quick & Easy was not negligent in
constructing and maintaining its firewall and is in full compliance with
Section 15(f), it seems that Quick & Easy has not violated Rule 14e-3.
As to Quick & Easy's possible liability under Rule lOb-5, Proposed
Rule 10b5-l(c)(ii) provides limited affirmative defenses that resolves the
possession-use dichotomy by providing that liability attaches when the
trader "was aware of nonpublic information." '163 The defense applies to
entities that trade, such as Quick & Easy, provided that they have
"implemented reasonable policies and procedures taking into considera-
tion the nature of the person's business to ensure that individuals making
investment decisions would not violate laws prohibiting trading on the
basis of material non-public information. '" 64 The preamble to the Rule
says this provision is derived from a similar provision in Rule 14e-
3(b). 165
In any event, one can conclude that Quick & Easy has not violated
Rule lOb-5, nor is it liable as a control person under Section 20(a)
because it "acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce
the act or acts constituting the violation of [Rule lOb-5 and Rule 14e-
3]."166
161. Rule 14e-3(b)(2).
162. Section 15(f) 1934 Act.
163. Proposed Rule 10b5-1(c)(ii).
164. Id.
165. Also, some guidance on the issue of the policing by firms of potential insider trading may
be deduced from the newly adopted Rule 17j-1 under the Investment Company Act, relating to the
required adoption by investment companies of "codes of ethics." The code of ethics addresses
"conflicts of interest activities that arise from personal trading activities of investment company
personnel." Investment Company Act Release No. 23958 (Aug 20, 1999).
166. Rule 20(a).
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On the other hand, it is possible that the head of the mergers and
acquisitions department at Blue & Blood has violated Rule 14e-3(d)(1).
Further, in view of the lack of any specific procedures at Blue & Blood
governing the handling of client confidences, it is possible that Blue &
Blood could be liable as a control person under Section 20(a) for the
Rule lOb-5 and Rule 14e-3 violations by the employee who traded
(assuming the employee is a labeled "person" under Section 20(a)) and
for the Rule 14e-3 violations by the head of the mergers and acquisitions
department. The issue here is whether Blue & Blood can establish that it
"acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the acts or
acts constituting the violation of [Rule lOb-5 or Rule 14e-3]."167 If Blue
& Blood has control person liability it will be liable under Section 20A
to the sellers who contemporaneously traded during the course of the
insider trading scheme that started at the firm.
In addition to potential liability under the contemporaneous trading
rule of Section 20A, Blue & Blood as a controlling person of the person
who violated Rule lOb-5 or Rule 14e-3 also faces the possibility of a
fine under Section 21A of the 34 Act. Under Section 21A(a)(3), the fine
on a controlling person "shall not exceed the greater of $1,000,000, or
three times the amount of the profits gained . . . as a result of such
controlled person's violation."
Section 21A(b) limits the liability of controlling persons. Under
Section 21A(b)(1)(A), no person is liable as a controlling person unless
the S.E.C. establishes that "such controlling person knew or recklessly
disregarded the fact that such controlled person was likely to engage in
the act or acts constituting the violation and failed to take appropriate
steps to prevent such act or acts before they occurred ..... The legisla-
tive history of this provision elaborates on the standard:
In order to seek imposition of a civil penalty, the Commission must
establish that a controlling person objectively disregarded a risk that a
controlled person was engaged in violations of the insider trading
laws. The risk involved must be such that to disregard it would con-
stitute a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable
person would exercise in such a situation.16 8
It is by no means certain that the S.E.C. could meet this standard in
the case of Blue & Blood. However, Quick & Easy has no potential
exposure to the fine under § 21A(a) because under Section 21A(b)(1)(B)
it could have no control person liability unless the S.E.C. established
that it "knowingly or recklessly failed to establish, maintain, or enforce
any policy or procedure required by section 15(f) . . . and such failure
167. Id.
168. H.R. REp. No. 100-910, at 18 (1988).
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substantially contributed to or permitted the occurrence of the act or acts
constituting the violation. 169 Since Quick & Easy is in full compliance
with Section 15(f), the S.E.C. could not meet this standard.
In addition to the fine, Blue & Blood could face a cease and desist
action under Section 21C of the 34 Act, as is discussed above. Further,
it is possible that Blue & Blood could have liability to Macro Ware for
the portion of the $50 million overpayment, attributable to the insider-
trading that originated at Blue & Blood. A similar issue was presented
in Litton Industries, Inc. v. Lehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb, Inc.17 In Lit-
ton, the court stated the issue as follows:
"This litigation presents the question whether an acquiring corpora-
tion may hold its investment banker, employees of the banker and
their tippees liable - pursuant to rule 1Ob-5, civil RICO, or common
law fraud - for insider trading in the stock of the target company
based on information misappropriated from the acquiring
corporation."1 71
Lehman Brother's Kuhn Loeb, Inc. [hereinafter Lehman], an investment
banking firm, was not named in the RICO and common law fraud
counts, but was named in the Rule lOb-5 action as a "controlling per-
son" and also in a negligence claim.' 72
In this case, the acquiring company, Litton Industries, Inc. [herein-
after Litton], retained Lehman to represent Litton in the acquisition of a
target company, Itek.' 73 Litton claimed that as a result of insider trading
in the stock of Itek by Dennis Levine, an employee of Lehman, and his
tippees, Litton was forced to "raise its tender offer for the outstanding
Itek stock" and Litton sought "damages based on overpayment for its
tender offer purchases of Itek stock." 174 The Second Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed the district court's grant of the defendants' motion for
dismissal of "all of Litton's claims for tender offer overpayment on the
grounds that the insider trading as a matter of law, did not cause the
injury alleged by Litton."'75 The Second Circuit held that "there is a
genuine issue of material fact concerning whether the trader appellees,
trading on the basis of confidential information belonging to Litton,
caused Litton's injury." 176
The court noted that for Litton to recover it must establish that the
169. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(A)(b)(a)(B).
170. 967 F.2d 742 (2d Cir. 1992).
171. Id. at 744.
172. See id.
173. See id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 745.
176. Id.
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traders' violations caused the loss.'77 The court said:
In the case at hand, there are three links that are required to establish
the chain of causation: (1) the trader[s] purchased stock on the basis
of misappropriated information; (2) this trading inflated the market
price of Itek stock; and (3) the Itek Board of Directors would have
accepted a lower offer from Litton, if not for the artificially inflated
market price of Itek stock.1 78 The court held that Litton had the bur-
den of showing that the "trading caused the market price of Itek stock
to rise and that the market price was a substantial factor in Itek
Board's assessment of Litton's offers."'
17 9
Putting this standard in the context of the hypothetical, Macro Ware
would have to prove that (1) the trading by the Blue & Blood associate
and the tippees caused the market price of the ALO stock to rise, and (2)
the increased market price was a substantial factor in causing Macro
Ware to pay a higher price for ALO than would have been paid in the
absence of the insider trading. In addition, Macro Ware would have to
establish that Blue & Blood has control person liability under Section
20(A).
Lehman was also named in a negligence claim. Both Blue & Blood
and Quick & Easy could face a negligence claim under the facts
presented in the hypothetical for failing to establish and maintain proper
controls to prevent their employees from engaging in insider trading. It
is instructive to consider the decision of the Delaware Chancery Court in
the Caremark case when analyzing this issue.1 80 Caremark arose in the
context of a review by Chancellor Allen of a settlement of a derivative
action and involved, inter alia, the question of whether a board of direc-
tors of a Delaware corporation could have liability for violation of its
duty to monitor the actions of the corporation's employees, notwith-
standing the presence of an exculpation provision pursuant to Section
102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law.' 8 1 Section
102(b)(7) permits a corporation to adopt a charter provision protecting
its directors from liability for breaches of due care made in good faith. 18 2
In analyzing this issue the Chancellor reasoned:
I turn to a consideration of... director inattention or 'negligence.'
Generally where a claim of directorial liability for corporate loss is
predicated upon ignorance of liability creating activities within the
corporation, as in Graham [v. Allis Chalmers, 188 A.2d 125 (Del.
177. See id. at 747.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 749.
180. In re Caremark Intern. Inc. Deriv. Lit., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
181. See id. at 960.
182. DEL. GEN'L CORP. LAW § 102(b)(7) (1997).
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1963) (setting out a red flag test for directorial liability)] or this case,
in my opinion only a sustained or systematic failure of the board to
exercise oversight - such as an utter failure to attempt to assure a
reasonable information and reporting system exists - will establish a
lack of good faith that is a necessary condition of liability.18 3
Although this standard may not be applicable for determining neg-
ligence in the context of the hypothetical (the standard may be lower), it
would appear that the management of Blue & Blood but not of Quick &
Easy might have exhibited an "utter failure to attempt to assure a reason-
able... system "for preventing insider trading in-the securities of Macro
Ware. 1
8 4
It would appear that Blue & Blood has potential liability to Macro
Ware under both Rule lOb-5 and a common law negligence claim for the
overpayment by Macro Ware in the tender offer. However, because
Quick & Easy does not appear to have been negligent and it has no
control person liability, it seems unlikely that it would have any liability
to Macro Ware.
Law firms and investment banking firms participating as advisors
in the merger and acquisition market should take appropriate measures
to minimize the potential that their employees and agents may engage in
insider trading - otherwise the firm itself may be liable to both inves-
tors and the injured client.
XVI. FOURTEENTH ISSUE: LAWYER'S AND INVESTMENT BANKER'S
ROLES IN COUNSELING A TARGET THAT WANTS TO
"JUST SAY No!"
Steve Vision's reaction to Bill King's offer on behalf of Macro
Ware for an acquisition by ALO was to "Just say no!" Steve directed
ALO's lawyers, Stone & Cold, and its investment bankers, Silk &
Stockings, to take every step to prevent the Macro Ware offer from suc-
ceeding. Silk & Stockings went so far as to issue an opinion, of ques-
tionable validity, that the $144 offer price was inadequate even though it
represented a forty percent premium over the trading price of ALO's
stock on the offer date.
What was the correct reaction of the lawyers and investment bank-
ers in this situation, particularly in view of the fact that their success
fees, as Steve has reminded them, are tied to the completion of the
merger-of-equals with Consumers Choice? Clearly, the ALO sharehold-
ers were worse off with the defensive tactics than if ALO had immedi-
183. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971.
184. Id.
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ately accepted the offer. Do Silk & Stockings and Stone & Cold have
any potential liability to the ALO shareholders?
The starting point of the analysis is an examination of the state law
governing the reaction of a target's directors to an unsolicited offer. It is
assumed for this purpose that ALO is incorporated in Delaware. Under
Delaware law, defensive actions undertaken by a target's directors are
governed by the standard set out by the Delaware Supreme Court in
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.185 In Unocal, the court reasoned
that because of the "omnipresent specter that a board [of a target in a
hostile transaction] may be acting primarily in its own interests"18 6 the
directors undertaking defensive tactics have the burden of establishing
that (1) "they had reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to cor-
porate policy and effectiveness existed ..."187 and (2) the defensive
measure was reasonable in relation to the threat posed."' Furthermore,
in Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp., the Delaware Supreme
Court held that to satisfy the test of being "reasonable in relation to the
threat posed" the defensive measure cannot be either "coercive or
preclusive" and must be within "the range of reasonableness."1 89
If this test is not satisfied, the directors are denied the benefit of the
business judgment rule, and they must then establish that the transaction
is "entirely fair." They could be personally liable if they fail to meet
that difficult burden, because a breach of the Unocal business judgment
is generally a duty of loyalty violation and not protected by any charter
provision limiting directors' liability for breaches of the duty of care
under Section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Business Corporation
Law. Thus, the potential liability of Steve Vision and the other directors
of ALO is significant if they fail to satisfy the Unocal standard with
respect to any defensive tactics they undertake.
Stone & Cold's first reaction to Steve's directive that all defensive
measures be undertaken should be to explain to Steve and to ALO's
board clearly and carefully the current state of the law governing defen-
sive tactics. They should emphasize that there must be reasonable
grounds for undertaking defensive actions and that the defensive tactics
must be reasonable.
The second reaction of Stone & Cold should be to resign from rep-
resenting either ALO or Consumers Choice or both, notwithstanding its
success fee arrangement. It would appear that at the point Macro Ware
185. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
186. Id. at 954.
187. Id. at 955.
188. See id.
189. 651 A.2d 1361 (1995).
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makes the offer, Stone & Cold has a clear conflict between its duty of
loyalty to Consumers Choice and its interest in merging with ALO and
its duty of loyalty to ALO, which may have an interest in terminating its
merger plans with Consumers Choice and being acquired by Macro
Ware. The Annotations to Model Rule 1.7, relating to conflicts of inter-
est, provide that "[w]hen a conflict of interest arises during the course of
representation, the lawyer must withdraw in accordance with Rule
1.16."190
Silk & Stockings also has a conflict and should resign as well.
However, the facts indicate that Silk & Stockings has issued a questiona-
ble opinion that the $144 offer price is inadequate. They did so at the
urging of Steve Vision. Silk & Stockings may have exposed itself to
potential liability to the shareholders of ALO for either negligently or
intentionally preparing an inaccurate fairness opinion. In Schneider v.
Lazard Freres & Co., the court held that under New York law the
investment banking firm of Lazard Freres had a duty of care to the
shareholders of RJR Nabisco in advising a special committee of the
directors on a proposed management buyout. 191 The court reasoned that
in
this 'buyout' context, if something less than the highest possible price
was obtained, the loss was sustained by the shareholders, not the cor-
poration, and, for that reason, we are of the view that the relationship
between the shareholders and the Special Committee was essentially
that of principal and agent on which principles of corporate law
should not be superimposed.1 92
The holding in Schneider was distinguished in Meyer v. Goldman
Sachs & Co., 193 also decided under New York law. Meyer involved a
claim by a target's shareholders that the target's investment bankers had
given negligent advice to the target's outside directors in connection
with the acquisition of the target.194 Distinguishing Schneider and hold-
ing for the investment bankers, the court reasoned that the target's direc-
tors "were not members of a special committee set up specifically to
advise and protect [the shareholders'] interest in a buyout auction in
which management was a participant."' 195 In analyzing Meyer and
Schneider, Tariq Mundiya says:
it appears that shareholders who claim that their financial interest
have been harmed by an investment bank's negligent advice or opin-
190. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra note 2, Rule 1.7.
191. 552 N.Y.S.2d 571 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
192. Id. at 575.
193. 651 N.Y.S.2d. 304 (1st Dep't 1996).
194. See id.
195. Id. at 304.
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ion where there is no special committee created for the purpose of
protecting shareholders' interests may assert a cause of action under
New York law for 'negligence' only if such shareholders can estab-
lish the elements of a cause of action for . . . negligent
misrepresentation. 196
On the other hand, in In Re Daisy Systems, the Ninth Circuit held
that a bankruptcy trustee for an acquiring firm, Daisy, that went into
bankruptcy after making an acquisition could bring an action against its
investment banker, Bear Steams, for professional negligence and breach
of fiduciary duty.' 97 The court found that the engagement letter between
Bear Steams and Daisy did not limit Bear Steams' professional respon-
sibility in advising Daisy. The court found the appropriate standard to
be the "duty of care in the investment banking community." '198 The
court remanded for a determination of whether Bear Steams breached its
duty of care. 199
Furthermore, the court held that it was a question of fact whether
Bear Steams owed a fiduciary duty to Daisy. Rejecting Bear Steams's
position that its relationship with Daisy was "not a fiduciary relationship
as a matter of law," the court found that the existence of such a relation-
ship is a "question of fact which properly should be resolved by looking
to the particular facts and circumstances of the relationship at issue.'' 200
The court continued:
Two important issues of fact that must be resolved before it can be
determined whether a fiduciary relationship existed between Daisy
and Bear Steams are the questions of agency and confidentiality. As
confidentiality is an element of a fiduciary relationship ... resolution
of the fiduciary question in this case will turn in part on whether
Daisy reposed confidences in Bear Steams. Moreover, among the
terms of Bear Steams's retention was a provision stating that it would
be acting on Daisy's behalf. Should a fact finder determine from the
record that an agency relationship existed between the parties....
then a fiduciary relation should be presumed to exist.
2°
'
The court however, said: "Every relationship between an invest-
ment advisor and client is not of a fiduciary nature, and determining
when fiduciary obligations are in fact owed will depend in large part
upon the particular facts involved. 20 2 The court therefore remanded for
196. Mundiya, Liability of Investment Banks, supra note 1, at 301-02.
197. 97 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 1996).
198. Id. at 1176.
199. See id. at 1181.
200. Id. at 1178.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 23.
2000]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
a determination of whether a fiduciary relationship existed and if so
whether Bear Steams' breached that duty.
On remand the "jury found that (1) a fiduciary duty did exist
between Bear Steams and Daisy, (2) Bear Steams did not breach that
duty; and (3) Bear Steams committed professional negligence. The jury
awarded Daisy $108 million, or 39% of the $277 million in damages
that Daisy claimed to have occurred. 2 °3 Counsel for Daisy, "claimed
that, had the jury found that Bear Steams had breached its fiduciary
duty, 'the award could have approached the billion dollar mark [and
that] [i]t will, happen, perhaps in the next case."2°' The court reduced
the jury verdict to $36 million, and this decision is now on appeal.20 5
Several Delaware courts have arrived at a different result, finding
that investment bankers for a company do not have a fiduciary duty to
shareholders.2°6 For example, in In re Shoe-Town, Inc. Stockholders
Litig., the court reasoned: "[B]ecause a fairness opinion or an outside
valuation is not an absolute requirement [in a change of control situa-
tion] under Delaware law, it makes little sense to strap those investment
banks, which are retained, with the duties of a fiduciary. 20 7
The lesson here for Silk & Stockings is that by rendering the opin-
ion that the price is inadequate, it may have exposed itself to liability on
the grounds that it has violated (1) its fiduciary duty to ALO, along the
lines of the claim in Daisy; or to the ALO shareholders, along the lines
of the claim in Schneider, (2) it has engaged in malpractice in issuing a
defective valuation opinion, along the lines of the claim in Daisy, or (3)
it has engaged in negligent misrepresentation, which is a claim that
would be allowed even under the approach in Meyer.
XVII. CONCLUSION
This article demonstrates that the current private and public merger
and acquisition landscape presents numerous ethical challenges for law-
yers and investment bankers. A misstep can lead not only to sanctions
for violation of ethical standards but also to liability for breach of fiduci-
ary or statutory duties. The lesson is clear: "Proceed with caution."
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. See Mundiya, Liability of Investment Bankers, supra note 1, at 294, 318.
206. See Haire, Investment Bankers, supra note 1, at 281.
207. In re Shoe-Town, Inc Stockholders Litig., No. 9483, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 14, at *22
(Del. Ch. Feb. 12, 1990).
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